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I. Introduction
Despite repeated proclamations that "the International Labor
Organization is the competent body to set and deal with .. . [labor]
standards,"' the World Trade Organization ("WTO")2 nevertheless
t Undertaking a Masters in International Security at Sciences-Po, Paris and 2011 Lionel
Murphy Scholar.
tt Professor and Associate Dean (Research), The Chinese University of Hong Kong,
Faculty of Law; Senior Visiting Fellow, University of New South Wales, Faculty of
Law; Senior Fellow, Tim Fischer Centre for Global Trade and Finance. The authors
thank Esther Erlings for research assistance.
I World Trade Organization, Singapore Ministerial Declaration,
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regularly finds itself subjected to pressure to build labor standards
into its legal architecture.' The climax in the efforts to directly
link labor standards and the international trading regime came in
1999 at the WTO Ministerial Meeting in Seattle, when the United
States,' European Communities ("EC"), and Canada all submitted
proposals on labor standards and trade,' and nearly 50,000
protesters gathered to demand, inter alia, a fairer trading system
that upholds at least internationally recognized minimum labor
standards.6 Yet, developing countries vehemently opposed the
idea that trading rights could be conditional on compliance with
labor standards, ensuring that even the most innocuous proposals
WT/MIN(96)/DEC, 36 I.L.M. 218, 220 (1997).
2 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, April 15,
1994, 33 1.L.M. 1125, 1144 [hereinafter WTO Agreement].
3 See infra Part II T 2.
4 World Trade Organization, Communication from the United States: Preparations
for the 1999 Ministerial Conference - WTO's Forward Work Program, WT/GC/W/382
(Nov. 1, 1999), available at http://docsonline.wto.org (click on simple search, then enter
WT/GC/W/382 as the document number and click "search") (proposing "the
establishment of a WTO Working Group on Trade and Labor"). U.S. President Clinton
controversially weighed in on the debate during the Seattle Ministerial, stating:
What we ought to do first of all is to adopt the United States' position on having
a working group on labor within the WTO, and then that working group should
develop these core labor standards, and then they ought to be a part of every
trade agreement, and ultimately I would favor a system in which sanctions
would come for violating any provision of a trade agreement.
Michael Paulson, Clinton Says He Will Support Trade Sanctions For Worker Abuse,
SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Dec. 1, 1999, at Al.
5 See World Trade Organization, Preparations for the 1999 Ministerial
Conference: Summary of Proposals, JOB(99)/4797/Rev.3 at 169, 175, 186 (1999),
available at http://www.wto.org/English/thewtoe/minist-e/min99_e/min99_e.htm
(under Members' proposals; click on "download in MS Word format") [hereinafter
WTO Summary of Proposals].
6 Of course, many of the protestors were also demanding a fairer trading system to
better meet the needs of developing countries, while others were advocating for the
environment, raising issues of consistency. See Andrew Samet, Doha and Global Labor
Standards: The Agenda Item That Wasn't, 37 INT'L LAW. 753, 756 (2003). See generally
Clyde Summers, Battle in Seattle: Free Trade, Labor Rights, and Societal Values, 22 U.
PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 61 (2001) (discussing minimum labor standards).
7 India is among those countries most strongly opposed to linking trade and labor.
See, e.g., Kevin Kolben, The New Politics of Linkage: India's Opposition to the
Workers' Rights Clause, 13 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 225 (2006) (discussing the
obstacles to adopting labor standards through the WTO and suggesting alternative
methods such as bilateral treaties).
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dealing with the trade-labor linkage were stillborn.! Continued
resistance from developing countries, coupled with the Bush
administration's refusal to promote the issue at the subsequent
WTO negotiating round (the so-called "Doha Development
Agenda" or "Doha Round"),9 meant that the trade-labor question
has since been moved off the agenda for the WTO.'o
Despite being ignored in the current Doha Round," the issue
of whether labor standards should be incorporated into the WTO
continues to evoke heated discussion at the domestic, regional, and
international levels and features prominently in academic and non-
governmental organization ("NGO") discourse.12 More
8 The following are examples of this conduct: (1) The Canadian proposal merely
called for a WTO working group to examine the links between trade, development, and
social and environmental policies; (2) the United States proposed the establishment of a
WTO Working Group on Trade and Labor to investigate "the effects of the multilateral
trading system on the living standards and employment opportunities of working men
and women around the world"; and (3) the European Communities proposed the
establishment of a joint International Labor Organization and WTO Standing Working
Forum on "globalization and labor." See WTO Summary of Proposals, supra note 5, at
152-53, 186, 175.
9 See Bryan Mercurio, Reflections on the WTO and the Prospects for its Future,
10 MELB. J. INT'L L. 49 (2009) (analyzing the impediments to completing the Doha
mandate); Trade Negotiations Committee, Lamy Sees "New Dynamic" Emerging in
Negotiations, WTO 2010 NEWS ITEMS (July 27, 2010),
http://www.wto.org/english/newse/newsl0 e/tnc dgstat 27jull0 e.htm (discussing
the state of the Doha negotiations); Sungjoon Cho, Is the WTO Passd?: Exploring the
Meaning of the Doha Debacle (Chi. Kent C. Law Working Paper, 2009), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1403464 (discussing further
impediments to completing the Doha mandate).
10 Samet, supra note 6, at 757.
11 The Doha Ministerial Declaration simply states that WTO Members "reaffirm
[their] declaration made at the Singapore Ministerial Conference regarding
internationally recognized core labor standards. [They] take note of work under way in
the International Labor Organization ("ILO") on the social dimension of globalization."
World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 Nov. 2001,
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/l, 41 I.L.M. 746, 747 (2002) [hereinafter Doha Declaration].
12 See generally KIMBERLY ANN ELLIOTT & RICHARD B. FREEMAN, CAN LABOR
STANDARDS IMPROVE UNDER GLOBALIZATION? 2 (2003) ("The world economy will
function more effectively if the implementation of labor standards is improved ... and if
market access for LDC [less developed countries'] products is improved . . . as long as
these products meet minimum global standards."); CHRISTINE KAUFMANN,
GLOBALISATION AND LABOR RIGHTS: THE CONFLICTING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CORE
LABOR RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL EcoNOMIC INSTITUTIONS 9 (2007) ("A possible 'race
to the bottom' as far as labor standards are concerned is therefore seen as one of the
major threats of globalisation."); Joost Pauwelyn, Human Rights in WTO Dispute
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importantly, while the WTO's Dispute Settlement Body ("DSB")
has not been asked to determine whether unilateral trade
restrictions on goods produced in violation of labor standards are
consistent with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Tradel3
("GATT") or any other WTO covered agreement, it has repeatedly
been called upon to identify some of the contours of the
Settlement, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 205 (T. Cottier, J. Pauwelyn
& E. Birgi eds., 2005) ("There are two main avenues or paradigms to integrate human
rights into trade agreements, including the WTO: one would use the WTO to enforce
compliance with human rights . . . another relies on human rights to temper or detract
from WTO obligations."); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Human Rights and International
Trade Law: Defining and Connecting the Two Fields, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 29 (T. Cottier, J. Pauwelyn & E. Burgi eds., 2005) ("GATT rules
should be perceived not only as foreign policy instruments . . . but also as domestic
policy instruments that could serve not only economic functions . . . but also
'constitutional functions."'); JAN MARTIN WITTE, REALIZING CORE LABOR STANDARDS:
THE POTENTIAL AND LIMITS OF VOLUNTARY CODES AND SOCIAL CLAUSES 15-21 (2008),
available at http://www.gtdforum.org/files/1 1-09-08-9-47-56_Studie-CLS-
endfassung.pdf (analyzing the framework and potential of international core labor
standards); Susan A. Aaronson, Seeping in Slowly: How Human Rights Concerns are
Penetrating the WTO, 6 WORLD TRADE REV. 413 (2007) ("Some of the most forceful
critics argue that the WTO system of rules makes it harder for member states to meet
their obligations to respect, protect and advance human rights as delineated in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights . . . ."); Jose E. Alvarez, Symposium: The
Boundaries of the WTO, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (2002) (discussing linkage and potential
future WTO boundaries); Christine Kaufmann & Laura Meyer, Trade and Human
Rights, 1 HUM. RTs. & INT'L LEGAL DISCOURSE 61 (2007) (comparing the various
methods available to solve conflicts arising between human rights and international
trade); Gabrielle Marceau, WTO Dispute Settlement and Human Rights, 13 EUR. J. INT'L
L. 753, 754 (2002) ("It is suggested that a good faith interpretation of the relevant WTO
and human rights provisions should lead to a reading of WTO law coherent with human
rights law.").
13 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-ll, 55
U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]. The GATT is now included as one of several covered
agreements in the WTO. In 2004, the DSB narrowly avoided having to rule on a human
rights-motivated procurement directive promulgated by the State of Massachusetts in
which the European Communities and Japan challenged Massachusetts' procurement
law barring state agencies from doing business with entities that were engaging with
Burma as a violation of the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement. Request for
Consultations by the European Communities, United States-Measure Affecting
Government Procurement, WT/DS88/1 (June 26, 1997), available at
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2004/september/tradoc 118765.pdf. The dispute
was averted when the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated the Massachusetts law on
constitutional grounds. See Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363
(2000).
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relationship between trade and non-trade issues.14 To date, the
DSB has not been asked to determine whether conditioning
preferential market access through Generalized System of
Preferences ("GSP") schemes on compliance with certain labor
standards" is consistent with the WTO's Enabling Clause.' 6 It is,
14 See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain
Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R (Nov. 6, 1998), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/dispue/58rw-e.pdf (concerning U.S. measures
seeking to prohibit the importation of shrimp from countries with insufficient measures
to protect sea turtles during shrimp harvesting) [hereinafter U.S.-Shrimp].
15 For instance, under the GSP established in the U.S. Trade Act of 1974, the
President must consider whether a potential recipient county has taken steps to
implement internationally recognized workers' rights in determining its eligibility for
beneficiary developing status, and this decision can be reviewed upon request. Trade
Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2462 (2002) [hereinafter Generalized System of Preferences].
The European Union's GSP+ system also allows granting additional tariff preferences to
developing countries that are committed to ratifying and implementing a list of human
rights and good governance conventions. Council Regulation 732/2008, 2008 O.J. (L
211) 1, 3 (EC). For a further discussion on this topic, see infra Part II.A.I.
16 Differential and More Favourable Treatment Reciprocity and Fuller
Participation of Developing Countries, L/4903 (Nov. 28, 1979), available at
www.wto.org/gatt docs/English/SULPDF/90970166.pdf, [hereinafter Enabling Clause].
However, the Appellate Body held that preference schemes under the Enabling Clause-
a clause allowing preferences to be given by developed WTO Member countries to
developing states notwithstanding the non-discriminatory clauses contained in the
GATT-are not unconstrained. Appellate Body Report, European Communities-
Conditions For The Granting Of Tariff Preferences To Developing Countries,
WT/DS246/AB/R (April 4, 2004) [hereinafter E.C. Tariff Conditions] (upholding an
earlier Panel decision regarding "Drug Arrangements" promulgated by the E.C. which
eliminated tariffs for only certain developing countries and which found that the E.C.
regulations had not met the requirements for the Enabling Clause Exceptions to the
GATT Equal Treatment provisions). More specifically, the Appellate Body found that
"only preferential tariff treatment that is 'generalized, non-reciprocal and non-
discriminatory' is covered under paragraph 2(a) of the Enabling Clause," and that
"paragraph 3(c) [of the Enabling Clause] suggests that tariff preferences under GSP
schemes may be 'non-discriminatory' when the relevant tariff preferences are addressed
to a particular 'development, financial [or] trade need' and are made available to all
beneficiaries that share that need." Id §§ 147, 165. At least one commentator argues
that the GSP+ arrangement remains inconsistent with the standard and would be in
violation of the GATT. See Lorand Bartels, The WTO Legality of the EU's GSP+
Arrangement, 10 J. INT'L EcoN. L. 869, 870 (2007) ("[T]he substantive criteria chosen
by the EU to select GSP+ beneficiaries ... do not meet the Appellate Body's criteria for
differential tariff treatment of developing countries . . . [and] the EU's requirement that
would-be beneficiaries must have applied by a certain date, replicates the problem of the
'closed list' of beneficiaries that was fatal to the earlier incarnation of the EU's GSP.").
For a historical overview of GATT and the Enabling Clause, and background on
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however, likely that a WTO dispute on one or more of these issues
will arise, 7 and the inevitable arguments in support of interpreting
trade and economic rules in conformity with human rights
obligations will require discussion, analysis, and interpretation.
Given the uncertainty surrounding the consistency of unilateral
trade restrictions for goods produced in violation of labor
standards under the GATT, along with the rapid increase in labor
standards and provisions appearing in GSPs and recently
concluded bilateral and regional free trade agreements ("FTAs"),' 8
the time is ripe to review the trade-labor link and to consider what,
if any, role the WTO should play in upholding labor standards
without jeopardizing its key objectives of enhancing trade
liberalization and eliminating discrimination in international trade
relations.19
preference schemes (with an American focus), see generally JEANNE J. GRIMMETT,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 22183, TRADE PREFERENCES FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
AND THE WTO (2008).
17 See Int'l L. Assn. Comm. on Int'l Trade L., Resolution No. 5/2008 (2008),
available at http://www.ila-hq.org/download.cfm/docid/96BD6A70-864B-4BAE-
970837A51F65B250 ("[I]t is likely that WTO dispute settlement bodies will be
confronted-as has happened in national and regional economic courts and arbitral
tribunals-with human rights arguments in support of interpreting trade and economic
rules in conformity with the human rights obligations of the countries concerned, or with
related requests for 'judicial comity' or 'judicial deference."').
18 See Lorand Bartels, Social Issues: Labor, Environment and Human Rights, in
BILATERAL AND REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS: COMMENTARY, ANALYSIS AND CASE
STUDIES (Simon Lester & Bryan Mercurio eds., 2009); WITTE, supra note 12, at 29-5 1;
Kamala Dawar, Assessing Labor and Environmental Regimes in Regional Trading
Arrangements, 37 LEGAL ISSUES OF EcoN. INTEGRATION 339 (2010); Pablo Lazo Grandi,
Trade Agreements and Their Relation to Labor Standards: The Current Situation 8-34
(Int'l Ctr. for Trade & Sustainable Dev., Issue Paper No. 3), available at
http://ictsd.org/l/publications/61843/ (select "Trade Agreements and Their Relations to
Labour Standards: the Current Situation").
19 See WTO Agreement, supra note 2, at 9 (listing the following objectives for the
WTO:
[R]aising standards of living, ensuring full employment and a large and steadily
growing volume of real income and effective demand, and expanding the
production of and trade in goods and services, while allowing for the optimal
use of the world's resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable
development, seeking both to protect and preserve the environment and to
enhance the means for doing so in a manner consistent with their respective
needs and concerns at different levels of economic development.).
See also Doha Declaration, supra note 11, at 746 (affirming the objectives of the WTO).
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This article proceeds as follows: Part II assesses the normative
question of whether the WTO is the appropriate forum to enforce
compliance with labor standards. It not only demonstrates why
much of the concern surrounding the WTO's engagement with the
"non-trade" issue of labor rights is overstated and can be
overcome, but also offers salient insight into why the WTO should
view trade restrictions which encourage compliance with Core
Labor Standards ("CLS") as compatible with the philosophical
underpinnings of the WTO and key principles of public
international law.20 Having established that the WTO should play
a role in the enforcement of CLS, Part III proceeds to evaluate the
implementation options. The section first evaluates the "judicial
method," whereby the DSB would permit Members to
differentiate between goods produced in violation of the
International Labor Organization's Declaration on Fundamental
Principles and Rights at Work ("ILO Declaration") either by: (1)
Narrowing the current interpretation of 'like' products so as to
ensure that differentiating between products produced in violation
of the ILO Declaration do not violate GATT provisions, such as
most favored nation ("MFN") and national treatment ("NT"); or
(2) ensuring that such restrictions fit into the interpretive
framework of an exception contained in Article XX of the GATT.
Part III then considers the possibility of a legislative response
to the issue and recommends that, although the legislative
approach offers significantly more legitimacy than does judicial
incorporation of CLS, political difficulties make it an unviable
alternative, and any movement on the issue would have to be
20 For the purpose of this article, we consider the four CLS contained in the
International Labor Organization's 1998 Declaration on Fundamental Principles and
Rights at Work ("ILO Declaration"): (1) Freedom of association and the effective
recognition of the right to collective bargaining; (2) the elimination of all forms of forced
and compulsory labor; (3) the effective elimination of child labor; and (4) the elimination
of discrimination in respect of employment. Int'l Labour Org., ILO Declaration on
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, art. 2, 37 1.L.M. 1233 (June 18, 1998)
[hereinafter ILO Declaration]; see also World Summit for Social Development, March
6-12, 1995, Copenhagen Report of the World Summit for Social Development,
Commitment 3(i), U.N. Doc A/CONF.166/9 (Apr. 19, 1995) ("[We will] safeguard the
basic rights and interests of workers and to this end, freely promote respect for relevant
International Labor Organization conventions, including those on the prohibition of
forced and child labor, the freedom of association, the right to organize and bargain
collectively, and the principle of non-discrimination.").
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accomplished through the dispute settlement mechanism. Part IV
concludes.
II. Do Labor Standards Belong in the WTO?
Critics, such as Jagdish Bhagwati, argue that labor standards
have no place in the WTO because it is an organization that exists
primarily to promote mutually beneficial, non-coercive trade
through reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements
aimed at reducing barriers to trade.2' Under this view, the
incorporation of labor standards for the purpose of upholding
certain rights within a Member State is not a concern of the WTO,
which has as its key objective the furtherance of Member rights
regarding market access to other Members by upholding mutually
agreed upon tariff rates and other concessions.
Bhagwati's view that the WTO's role is limited to regulating
"pure" trade issues for the purposes of trade liberalization ignores
that the GATT and WTO, as well as human rights treaties and
organizations, were created for the purpose of increasing human
welfare,22 and for the considerable evolution of the aims,
objectives, and roles of the international trading regime, starting
from the establishment of the GATT in 1947.23 For example, the
21 See Jagdish Bhagwati, Afterword: the Question of Linkage, 96 AM. J. INT'L L.
126, 127-128 (2002) (discussing the inclusion of special interest considerations in the
WTO, such as the environment or labor rights); see also Jagdish Bhagwati et al., Third
World Intellectuals and NGOs Statement Against Linkage (Nov. 1999), available at
https://www2.bc.edu/james-anderson/twin-sall2.pdf (concluding that linking labor and
trade will serve to protect developed countries from developing country competition);
Robert M. Stem & Katherine Terrell, Labor Standards and the World Trade
Organization (Ford Sch. of Pub. Pol'y Res. Seminar in Int'l Econ., Discussion Paper No.
499, 2003), available at
http://www.fordschool.umich.edu/rsie/workingpapers/Papers476-500/r499.pdf (arguing
that the WTO and similar organizations are not the vehicles through which to achieve
increased labor standards because "[t]he process of economic change is complex and
cannot be managed by mandates").
22 See Bamali Choudhury et al., A Call for a WTO Ministerial Decision on Trade
and Human Rights, in THE PROSPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGULATION: FROM
FRAGMENTATION TO COHERENCE (Thomas Cottier & Panagiotis Delimatsis eds., 2011)
(discussing the linkage between welfare aspects of the post-World War II creation of the
GATT); see also Martii Koskenniemi & Paivi Leino, Fragmentation of International
Law? Postmodern Anxieties, 15 LEIDEN J. OF INT'L L. 553, 572 (2002).
23 Of particular note was the addition of Part IV of the GATT, entitled "Trade and
Development," in 1965. See GRIMMETr, supra note 16, at 2.
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preamble to the WTO Agreement cites "sustainable development"
as an objective to be balanced against economic objectives.24 To
most, human rights would be considered an element of
''sustainable development" and thus implicitly included within the
scope of the WTO.25  More directly, the WTO has expanded its
coverage beyond "border measures," such as import tariffs, to
include other policies which might affect trade-for instance,
domestic policies concerning government regulation of
investment, product and health standards, agricultural policy, and
government procurement.2 6 The primary purpose of regulation on
such topics has little, if anything, to do with trade, but instead
concerns the fact that regulation in these areas could affect foreign
producers and trade more generally.27 Furthermore, the
Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPS
Agreement") offers a cogent example of obligations imposed on
wholly domestic activities, where such activities may affect
24 See U.S.-Shrimp, supra note 14, T 129 n.107, WT/DS58/AB/RUS (May 15,
1998).
25 See Choudhury et al., supra note 22; Salman Bal, International Free Trade
Agreements and Human Rights: Reinterpreting Article XX of the GATT, 10 MINN. J.
GLOBAL TRADE 62, 63 (2001) ("[T]here is a direct and appropriate involvement by
international trade in the protection of human rights.").
26 See Agreement on Agriculture, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, 33 I.L.M. 1125, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs e/legale/14-ag.pdf (seeking to provide predictability
and stability for countries importing and exporting agricultural goods); Agreement on the
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 33 I.L.M. 1125, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop e/spse/spsagr e.htm [hereinafter SPS Agreement]
(establishing food safety, animal, and plant health regulations to be applied only as
necessary to protect life and health); Agreement on Government Procurement, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 33 I.L.M.
1125, available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs e/1gpr-94_e.pdf (facilitating
participation of developing countries); Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of
Investment Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, 1868 U.N.T.S. 186, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal-e/18-trims.pdf [hereinafter TRIMs Agreement]
(seeking to restrict investment measures that limit and distort trade).
27 See Drusilla Brown, Alan Deardorff & Robert Stem, Pros and Cons of Linking
Trade and Labor Standards 12-13 (Univ. of Mich. Sch. of Pub. Pol'y, Discussion Paper
No. 477), available at http://www.fordschool.umich.edu/rsie/workingpapers/Papers476-
500/r477.pdf (discussing the impact of trade regulation on labor rights, standard of
living, and other social concerns in developing countries).
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international trade.28 Despite its name, the TRIPS Agreement sets
minimum standards and requirements on a range of issues which
until now, were considered purely domestic considerations
(ranging from the term of protection for a patent to the availability
of judicial review and the criminal sanctions for certain
infringements).29
It is therefore a gross overstatement-and, in fact, simply
incorrect-to state that the WTO has an inherent institutional
difficulty imposing obligations that could be viewed as wholly
internal. Of course, the WTO cannot incorporate every area or
subject matter which merely may have an effect on trade and
traders; there must be some criteria upon which to assess the
suitability of incorporation. This is not to say that whether a topic
is "trade-related" or "affects" trade is irrelevant. On the contrary,
it should be a factor upon which to assess the suitability of a topic
for incorporation into the WTO. Using the inclusion of
intellectual property rights ("IPRs") into the WTO as a guide,
three other relevant factors emerge. First, IPRs were seen to "have
a significant enough impact on the international economy that they
should be regulated internationally even when no foreign party is
directly involved.""o More specifically, since IPRs are a body of
standards which positively affect trade flows, their under-
enforcement was an impediment to the WTO's fundamental
intention to expand international trade.3 1 Second, rights holders
and governments alike realized that the existing international
28 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC,
1867 U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
29 For example, Article 33 of the TRIPS Agreement requires patents to be granted
for a period of at least twenty years, to be counted from the filing date. See id. art. 33.
Articles 42 through 49 focus on civil and administrative procedures and remedies, and
Article 61 addresses criminal procedures, stating that "[m]embers shall provide for
criminal procedures and penalties to be applied at least in cases of willful trademark
counterfeiting or copyright piracy on a commercial scale." See id arts. 42-49, 61.
30 Chantal Thomas, Trade-Related Labor and Environment Agreements?, 5 J. INT'L
EcoN. L. 791, 794 (2002).
31 The Preamble to the GATT states that its purposes involve "expanding the
production and exchange of goods," while the Preamble to the WTO Agreement contains
a commitment to "expanding the production of and trade in goods and services." GATT,
supra note 13, Preamble; WTO Agreement, supra note 2, Preamble.
674 [Vol. XXXVII
2012] AGREEMENT ON TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS OF LABOR
mechanism for enforcing international IPRs was insufficient.3 2
Those same parties also viewed the World Intellectual Property
Organization ("WIPO") treaties as failing to adequately protect
IPRs (both in scope and coverage), and realized that in order to
increase protection to an acceptable level, the forum of
negotiations must be shifted." Third, many simply believed that
IPRs were inherently deserving of protection.34
By applying the same reasoning to CLS, the following four
criteria would need to be satisfied in order for one to consider
incorporation of CLS into the WTO framework: (1) CLS must be
"trade-related"; (2) protection of CLS would positively affect
international trade flows; (3) CLS are not sufficiently protected
and enforced; and (4) CLS would need to be viewed as inherently
deserving of protection. Even if one is not convinced that
satisfying the above four criteria is justification for incorporating
CLS into the WTO, there are several textual-based arguments
from the GATT which favor such incorporation. The remainder of
this section explores both issues. Part A analyzes whether the
CLS satisfy each of the four criteria. Part B explores additional
GATT-based arguments supporting the incorporation of CLS into
the WTO framework.
A. Core Labor Standards Deserve Protection
1. Core Labor Standards Are "Trade-related"
The fact that labor directly affects market share and activity is
relatively uncontroversial." Labor is by nature an "intrinsic part
32 Although all of the notable WIPO-administered treaties contained provisions
relating to dispute settlement and even envisaged involvement of the International Court
of Justice ("J"), no dispute was ever referred to the ICJ based on these provisions.
See, e.g., Caroline Dommen, Raising Human Rights Concerns in the World Trade
Organization: Actors, Processes and Possible Strategies, 24 HUM. RTS. Q. 12 (2002);
Bryan Mercurio, Reconceptualising the Debate on Intellectual Property Rights and
Economic Development, 3(1) L. & DEV. REv. 65, 71 (2010).
33 See Mercurio, supra note 32, at 71-72.
34 Thomas, supra note 30, at 794.
35 Linkages between labor, trade, and regulation date as far back as the late-
eighteenth century and serious efforts to formulate international standards were made in
the late-nineteenth century. BOB HEPPLE, LABOR LAWS AND GLOBAL TRADE 25-29
(2005) (detailing the efforts made as early as 1788 to consider the issue of workers'
rights on an international scale when France considered abolishing a law requiring
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of the production process that culminates in the manufacture of
goods and services for trade."3 6  Simply stated, the conditions
under which a product is manufactured or produced impact the
quantity and cost of the product in the world market.3 7 As such, it
seems only natural that labor standards should be viewed as an
indispensable part of the effective trade in goods.
Additional evidence of this can be seen by the fact that the
drafters of the United Nations Havana Charter," which sought to
establish the failed International Trade Organization ("ITO"),
explicitly recognized the link and impact that labor has on
international trade by including a provision on labor. Specifically,
Article Seven of the Havana Charter (titled "Fair Labor
Standards") stated that "unfair labor conditions, particularly in
production for exports, create difficulties in international trade ...
[and] each member shall take whatever action may be appropriate
and feasible to eliminate such conditions within its territory."39
Thus, not only did trade negotiators in the 1940s identify the link
between labor and international trade, they also recognized that
unfair labor conditions create difficulties or distortions in the
market by lowering the price of goods below what would normally
exist in a competitive market and should be eliminated. 40  It is
clear that the drafters explicitly recognized labor as being related
to trade.4 '
Sunday to be a day of rest in order for France to increase its competitive advantage in the
market. In the early nineteenth century, England passed one of the first true pieces of
industrial worker protection legislation when it limited the hours of child workers in
cotton factories.).
36 Steve Hughes & Rorden Wilkinson, International Labour Standards and World
Trade: No Role for the World Trade Organisation?, 3 NEW POL. ECON. 375, 381 (1998).
37 See id
38 United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, Havana, Cuba, Nov. 21,
1947 - March 24, 1948, Final Act and Related Documents, Havana Charter for an
International Trade Organization, U.N. Doc. E/CONF.2/78, art. 7 (Apr. 1948).
39 Id; see also Steve Charnovitz, Influence of International Labour Standards on
the World Trading Regime -A Historical Overview, 126 INT'L LABOR REV. 565 (1987).
40 See generally Daniel Zaheer, Breaking the Deadlock: Why and How Developing
Countries Should Accept Labor Standards in the WTO, 9 STAN. J. L. Bus. & FIN. 69, 75
(2004) ("The WTO should incorporate labor standards because labor is a factor of
production, and failure by a government to regulate the means by which labor is utilized
constitutes a trade distortion . . . . [T]he WTO seeks to decrease trade distortions.").
41 Shortly thereafter, the United States unsuccessfully attempted to include labor
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Finally, the major industrialized countries already link labor
rights with trade in a similar fashion to the pre-TRIPS situation
with regard to IPRs.4 2 For instance, the United States links labor
and trade in at least three different ways. First, the United States
requires GSP beneficiaries to observe "internationally recognized
work rights" and be actively taking steps to implement certain
labor rights (as determined under the Act, and slightly differing
from the CLS) as a condition of receiving the preferential
treatment.4 3 Countries that have not complied with international
commitments to eliminate the worst forms of child labor are per se
ineligible to receive GSP preferences.4 4
Second, the United States includes labor provisions in its
standards in the GATT by proposing the following: "The Contracting Parties recognize
that all countries have a common interest in the achievement and maintenance of fair
labor standards related to the productivity, and thus the improvement of wages and
working conditions . . . and that unfair labor conditions . . . particularly in the production
for export, may create difficulties for international trade which nullify or impair benefits
under this Agreement." Commission on Foreign Economic Policy, Report to the
President and the Congress, H.R. Doc. No. 290 (1954), Staff Papers, 437-438. In 1983,
the European Communities unsuccessfully submitted a similar proposal to the GATT.
See Robert Howse, Brian Langille & Julien Burda, The World Trade Organisation and
Labour Rights: Man Bites Dog, in SOCIAL ISSUES, GLOBALISATION AND INTERNATIONAL
INSTITUTIONS: LABOUR RIGHTS AND THE EU, ILO, OECD AND WTO 177-78 (Virginia A.
Leary & Daniel Warner eds., 2006).
42 James Gathii argues that even regional trade judiciaries in Africa are now
entertaining human rights-related claims, even when there is no explicit treaty basis for
the tribunals to assume jurisdiction. See James Gathii, The Under-Appreciated
Jurisprudence ofAfrica's Regional Trade Judiciaries, 13 OR. REV. INT'L L. (forthcoming
2011).
43 Trade Act of 1984, 19 U.S.C. § 2462(b)(2)(G) (2010). These include the right to
associate, collective bargaining, prohibition on the use of any form of forced or
compulsory labor, a minimum age for employment of children, and acceptable
conditions of work with respect to wages, hours of work, and occupational health and
safety. The Act, however, does provide the President with a certain level of discretion.
Id. § 2467(4). Several other programs also include GSP schemes requiring that
beneficiaries take steps to protect internationally recognized worker rights. See, e.g.,
Generalized System of Preferences, supra note 15, § 2462; Caribbean Basin Recovery
Act of 2010, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2707 (2010); Andean Trade Preference Act of 2002, 19
U.S.C. §§ 3201-3206 (2010); African Growth and Opportunity Act of 2000, 19 U.S.C.
§§ 3701-3741 (2010).
44 19 U.S.C. § 2462(b)(2)(H). For an interesting historical overview of the GSPs,
see Lance Compa & Jeffrey S. Vogt, Labor Rights in the Generalized System of
Preferences: A 20-Year Review, 22 CoMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 199 (2001).
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FTAs.45 Beginning with the North American Trade Agreement
("NAFTA") in 199446 and becoming standard practice since the
U.S.-Jordan FTA in 2000,47 labor provisions were codified by the
Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority of 2002 ("BTPAA"),
which, inter alia, directs the President and trade negotiators to (1)
"ensure that a party to a trade agreement ... does not fail to
effectively enforce its . . . labor laws, through a sustained or
recurring course of action or inaction in a manner affecting
trade"; 48 (2) recognize that parties have the right to exercise
discretion with respect to labor law enforcement and regulation; 49
and (3) "strengthen the capacity of United States trading partners
to promote respect for core labor standards.""o
The BTPAA expired in 2007, but was quickly replaced with a
compromise agreement reached between leading Democrats in
Congress and the Bush administration, which also directly linked
labor with trade."' Entitled "A New Trade Policy for America,"
the agreement begins with calls to "[e]nsure that U.S. free trade
agreements raise standards of living [and] create new markets for
U.S. goods," to require countries "to adopt, maintain, and enforce
in their laws and practice, the basic international labor standards as
stated in the 1998 ILO Declaration," and to "[e]nsure that
government procurement promotes basic worker rights and
acceptable conditions of work."5 2 The agreement further required
the addition of four elements, pending and all future U.S. FTAs:
(1) Fully enforceable commitments that the FTA partner countries
45 For a brief overview, see Mary Jane Bolle, Cong. Research Serv., RS 22823,
Overview of Labor Enforcement Issues in Free Trade Agreements 4 (2008), available at
http://digitalcommons.ilr.comell.edu/keyworkplace/492.
46 Note that the first two FTAs negotiated by the United States with Israel in 1985
and Canada in 1988 did not include any provisions regarding labor standards. Id. at 2.
47 Bolle includes in a list of reasons behind the shift in U.S. policy towards the
inclusion of labor standards in FTAs that "it became increasingly accepted that labor
issues were related to trade and trade policy," as well as that producers in developing
countries tended to reduce wages in order to compete in the markets for low-cost goods.
Id.
48 19 U.S.C. § 3802(b)(l l)(A) (2004).
49 Id. § 3802(b)(1 1)(B).
50 Id. § 3802(b)(1 1)(C).
51 See Congress, Administration Trade Deal, Inside U.S. Trade, (World Trade
Organization Newsstand) (May 11, 2007); Bolle, supra note 45, at 4.
52 Bolle, supra note 45, at 4.
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would adopt and maintain in their laws and practices the ILO
Declaration; (2) fully enforceable commitments against FTA
partner countries that lower their labor standards; (3) new
limitations on discretionary "prosecution" and "enforcement" of
labor provisions; and (4) ensuring that labor provisions are subject
to the dispute-settlement mechanisms (and any resulting penalties)
of the FTAs."
Third, the United States links labor and trade through §301 of
the U.S. Trade Act of 1974, which permits trade sanctions against
states which fail to observe workers' rights.54 Under that Act, the
administration can initiate an investigation, or any interested
person can file a §301 petition requesting that the U.S.
administration investigate claims regarding unfair trade practices,
and take steps to remedy these practices." While an investigation
has never been initiated or a petition filed, the point is that the U.S.
Trade Act of 1974 already links labor with trade and, in doing so,
tacitly deems labor to be "trade-related."56
Likewise, the European Union ("EU") retains a similar scheme
whereby GSP benefits from general and special incentive
53 Id. In addition to binding legal obligations, U.S. FTAs also contain non-binding,
cooperation, and capacity-building provisions relating to trade and labor. See, e.g.,
Trade Promotion Agreement, art. 17.6, U.S.-Peru, Apr. 12, 2006, available at
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/fta/peru/asset upload-file73
9496.pdf; Free Trade Agreement, art. 17.6, U.S.-Colom., Oct. 12, 2011, available at
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/fta/colombia/asset_upload-fil
e993 10146.pdf, Central American-Dominican Republic-United States Free Trade
Agreement, art. 16.5, Aug. 5, 2004, available at
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/cafta/assetupload-file320_3
936.pdf; Free Trade Agreement, art. 16.5, U.S.-Morocco, June 15, 2004, 44 I.L.M. 544.
In July 2010, the United States initiated a formal labor rights complaint against
Guatemala under Article 16.2.1(a) of the Dominican Republic-Central America-United
States FTA ("CAFTA-DR-US"), claiming that Guatemala failed to effectively enforce
its worker protection laws, including those relating to freedom of association, the right to
bargain collectively, and the right to work in acceptable conditions. See Press Release,
U.S. Trade Rep., USTR Kirk Announces Labor Rights Trade Enforcement Case Against
Guatemala (July 31, 2010), available at http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-
releases/20 1 0/july/united-states-trade-representative-kirk-announces-lab.
54 19 U.S.C. §2101.
55 19U.S.C.§2411.
56 It should also be noted that §307 of the Tariff Act of 1930 prevents the
importation of goods produced by convicts or forced labor. The Tariff Act of 1930
§307, 19 U.S.C. §1307 (2006).
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arrangements for sustainable development and good governance,
with specific reference to certain human rights treaties." Unlike
the carrot and stick approach of the United States, the EU's special
incentive arrangements do not take a trade sanctions-based
approach to the issue. Rather, special incentive arrangements
offer additional incentives to beneficiaries who have ratified and
effectively implemented sixteen specific human rights conventions
and at least seven conventions related to environment and
governance." Special preferences can be withdrawn if the
beneficiary fails to implement human rights or labor rights."
Moreover, the EU similarly furthers the labor-trade link in its
FTAs with the majority of its agreements obliging FTA partner
countries to, inter alia, conform to a comprehensive set of labor
standards,6 or simply referencing labor conditions without any
accompanying obligation."1
57 Council Regulation 980/2005, 2005 O.J. (L 169) 1 (EC), extended by Council
Regulation 732/2008, 2008 O.J. (L 211) 1 (EC) [hereinafter Council Regulation]
(applying a scheme of generalized tariff preferences for the period from January 1, 2009
to December 31, 2011, and amending Regulation (EC) No 557/97, (EC) No 1933/2006,
and Commission Regulations (EC) No 1100/2006 and (EC) No 964/2007).
58 Id. art. 9(l)(a-e). As a result of continued violation of worker rights, the EU
withdrew preferences from Belarus in 2007. See generally Press Release, Mandelson
Sees New Bilateral EU Trade Deals Addressing Labour Standards; Calls on EU States to
Back Withdrawal of Trade Privileges from Belarus Over Labour Rights Violations,
available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/html/13143l.htm.
59 Council Regulation, supra note 57, art. 16(2).
60 See, e.g., The Trade, Development, and Cooperation Agreement, EU-S. Afr.,
Oct. 11, 1999, 1999 O.J. (L 311) 1, at Preamble, arts. 2, 4, 27, 65, 66, 68; EU-Chile
Association Agreement, Dec. 30, 2002, 2002 O.J. (L 352) 1, arts. 1, 12, 16, 43, 44, 135;
Economic Partnership Agreement, EU-CARIFORUM, Oct. 30, 2008, 2008 O.J. (L 289)
1, Preamble, arts. 8, 72, 73, 191-196, 224 [hereinafter EU-CARIFORUM]; the EU-South
Korea Free Trade Agreement, 2011 O.J. (L 127) 1, arts. 13. Note, however, that Article
13 provides its own limited form of dispute settlement which involves a committee of
experts "endeavour[ing] to agree on a resolution of the matter" and making their
resolution public (unless the Committee otherwise decides). Id. The dispute settlement
provisions of Article 14 (which include the possibility of trade retaliation) are not
available to claims under Article 13. See id. arts. 13.14-13.16.
61 See, e.g., Association Agreement, EU-Tunis., Mar. 30, 1998, 1998 O.J. (L 097)
2, Preamble, arts. 2, 28, 64, 69, 71; Association Agreement, EU-Morocco, Mar. 18,
2000, 2000 O.J. (L 70) 1, Preamble, arts. 2, 28, 64, 69, 71; Association Agreement, EU-
Isr., June 21, 2000, 2000 O.J. (L 147) 1, Preamble, arts. 2, 27, 63; EU-Lebanon Interim
Agreement, EU-Leb., Sept. 30, 2002, 2002 O.J. (L 262) 2, Preamble, arts. 2, 27, 64, 65;
Association Agreement, EU-Egypt, Dec. 23, 2003, Preamble, arts. 2, 26, 62, 63, 65, 66,
available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2004/june/tradoc_ 117680.pdf;
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2. Protection of Core Labor Standards Would Positively
Affect International Trade Flows
The incorporation of IPRs into the WTO framework indicates
that governments are willing to allow for the regulation of internal
activity if such regulation has the net effect of expanding the
volume of world trade and, in so doing, increasing the security and
predictability of markets.6 2 Yet, developing country governments,
industry associations, certain economists, and some developing
country NGOs6 3 often argue that the inclusion of CLS into the
WTO would not expand trade volumes, but would rather opeiate
as disguised protectionism to undermine developing countries'
comparative advantage in cheap labor vis-A-vis developed
countries." Thus, it is claimed that allowing Members to impose
Association Agreement, EU-Alg., Sept. 01, 2005, 2005 O.J. (L 265) 2, Preamble, art. 2,
35, 67, 74, 75, 82, 88. Other EU FTAs also reference social and economic human rights.
See, e.g., Association Agreement, EU-Palestinian Authority, July 16, 1997, 1997 O.J. (L
187) 3, Preamble, arts. 2, 25, 45; Interim Agreement, EC-Maced., Jan. 1, 1998, art. 1, 28,
available at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/fta/agreements/ecfyromfta.pdf,; Interim
Agreement, EC-Croat., Mar. 1, 2002, art. 1, 29, available at
http://www.worldtradelaw.net/fta/agreements/eccrofta.pdf; Interim Association
Agreement, EC-Montenegro, Dec. 28, 2007, 2007 O.J. (L 345) 2, art. 1, 30; Interim
Agreement, EC-Bosn. & Herz., June 6, 2008, 2008 O.J. (L 169) 13, art. 1; Free Trade
Agreement, EC-Alb., Sept. 9, 2006, 2006 O.J. (L 239) 2, art. 1. They also reference
general human rights. See Economic Partnership Agreement, EC-C6te d'lvoire, Nov.
10, 2008, 2008 O.J. (L 12129) 1, art. 1; see also Combating Child Labor, (EU
Commission Staff Working Paper 2010), available at
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/html/145803.htm (promoting CLS through EU trade
agreements).
62 The inclusion of other agreements, such as the Agreement on Trade-Related
Investment Measures ("TRIMs"), provide further evidence to this effect. See TRIMs
Agreement, supra note 26.
63 See, e.g., Third World Intellectuals and NGOs Statement Against Linkage
(TWIN-SAL) 2, http://www2.bc.edu/james-anderson/twin-salI2.pdf (last visited Jan. 11,
2012) (stating how ninety-nine intellectuals from the developing world and NGOs
declared their "unambiguous opposition to Linkage of Labour and Environmental
Standards to WTO and to trade treaties"). For further background discussion, see Adelle
Blackett, Trade Liberalization, Labour Law and Development: A Contextualization,
(International Institute for Labour Studies, Discussion Paper Series No 179), available at
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/inst/publications/discussion/dpl 7907.pdf.
64 For instance, the Chief Trade Administrator for the Organization of American
States, Jose M. Salazar-Xirinachs, has written that developing countries perceive that the
agenda for the inclusion of labor issues in trade negotiations is being driven by
politically powerful lobbying groups that are "not genuinely interested in improving the
well-being in the developing countries, but rather motivated by competitiveness concerns
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restrictive measures on products manufactured in contravention of
CLS would have the net effect of reducing world trade-a result
that is irreconcilable with the WTO's objective to further promote
trade-liberalization and the expansion of trade.6 5
Some commentators pursue this trajectory even further and
argue that the imposition of CLS is philosophically incompatible
with the WTO's goal of removing barriers to trade. Under this
logic, the imposition of CLS on Members implies that a "fixing"
of standards between countries, incompatible with market
principles as regulatory policy, is a matter of comparative
advantage. In other words, some argue that the imposition of
artificial international standards into the domestic regulatory
structure interferes with the market and thus impedes efficiency
and stifles competition. 6
Before responding to these arguments, it is useful to briefly
return to the four CLS in the ILO Declaration: (1) Freedom of
association and the effective recognition of the right to collective
bargaining; (2) the elimination of all forms of forced and
compulsory labor; (3) the effective elimination of child labor; and
(4) the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and
and perceptions that they will be the losers from freer trade." Jose Salazar-Xirinachs,
The Trade-Labor Nexus: Developing Countries' Perspectives, 3 J. INT'L ECON. L. 377,
380 (2000); see also Nigel Grimwalde, The GATT, the Doha Round and Developing
Countries, in THE WTO AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 1 (Homi Katrak & Roger Strange
eds., 2004) (calling the introduction of human rights into the WTO framework as
"having one purpose only-to provide developed countries with carte blanche to
introduce trade restrictions on their products under the guise of protecting human
rights."); Brian A. Langille, Eight Ways to Think About International Labor Standards,
31 J. WORLD TRADE 27, 31 (1997) ("In developing nations there is a widespread view
that the motivations behind the pursuit of the labor standards agenda are nothing more
than disguised protectionism on the part of the developed nations.").
65 Brown et al., supra note 27, at 240 (noting that a common standard set by all
countries would lead to a rise in the world price).
66 See Nancy Birdsall, Life is Unfair: Inequality in the World, FOREIGN POL'Y,
Summer 1998, at 87-88; Erika de Wet, Labor Standards in the Globalized Economy: The
Inclusion of Social Clause in the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade/World Trade
Organization, 17 HuM. RTS. Q. 443, 446-47 (1995); Farkhanda Mansoor, Laughter and
Tears of Developing Countries: The WTO and the Protection of International Labor
Standards, 14 CURRENTS: INT'L TRADE L.J. 59 (2005); J.M. Servais, The Social Clause in
Trade Agreements: Wishful Thinking or an Instrument of Social Progress? 128 INT'L
LAB. REV. 423 (1989) (arguing that the "unfair advantage" will inevitably lead to a "race
to the bottom").
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occupation. Critically, these rights do not encompass a "fair
minimum wage" or compliance with occupational health and
safety measures. It is generally accepted that low wages are a
legitimate comparative advantage in international trade and that
developing countries should not be denied that advantage; thus,
rather than seeking to "equalize" the comparative advantage
related to labor standards, the CLS concern practices that are not
determined or fixed by market mechanisms-the absence of
regulations actually denies workers comparable rights to use the
freedom they otherwise would have to enable them to seek out
better conditions of employment.67  Therefore, in denying the
workers the freedom to seek out better working conditions, the
absence of worker rights actually forecloses any possibility of a
"natural market correction. "6 In this sense, far from being
incompatible with market philosophy, the decision not to enforce
CLS in a domestic market is itself an interference with the free
market.
The realization that CLS are not about the equalization of
domestic market regulations allows for a more rational analysis of
the evidence available as to the economic effects of the
enforcement of CLS for both world trade and developing
countries. Significantly, the Organization for Economic Co-
Operation and Development ("OECD") published a study in 1996
questioning much of the "evidence" regarding CLS "leveling the
playing field" or undermining developing countries' comparative
advantage. The OECD report concluded that "it is conceivable
that the observance of core standards would strengthen the long-
term economic performance of all countries." 6 9 Furthermore, the
67 Summers, supra note 6, at 66.
68 Importantly, compliance with CLS is also theoretically and empirically
compatible with a liberal trading regime. This is because CLS preserve freedom of
choice for employees, while trade liberalization seeks to ensure other human freedoms,
including the right of individuals to trade with other individuals without discrimination
on the basis of country of location. See Christopher McCrudden & Anne Davis, A
Perspective on Trade and Labor Rights, 3 J. INT'L EcoN. L. 43, 51-52 (2000); see also
Sarah Cleveland, Human Rights Sanctions and International Trade: A Theory of
Compatibility, 5 J. INT'L EcoN. L. 133 (2002); Emst-Ulrich Petersmann, The WTO
Constitution and Human Rights, 3 J. INT'L ECON. L. 19, 22-23 (2000).
69 ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, TRADE,
EMPLOYMENT AND LABOUR STANDARDS: A STUDY OF CORE WORKERS' RIGHTS AND
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 105 (1996).
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report rejected the theory that countries which refuse to comply
with CLS enjoy better export performance than those countries
which do comply with CLS." Another OECD report published in
2000 was even more explicit in detailing what it saw as the source
of the benefits of complying with CLS: "Countries which
strengthen their core labor standards can increase economic
efficiency, by raising skill levels in the workforce and by relating
an environment which encourages innovation and high
productivity."7 1 An OECD report in 2005 affirmed the earlier
findings and concluded: "Countries do not gain sustained
improvement in competitiveness by disregarding core labor
standards. Indeed, to the contrary, improved working conditions
are found to contribute importantly to growth and development, a
point made in the final report by the ILO's World Commission on
the Social Dimension of Globalization."7 2  These findings and
conclusions are supported by independent economic analysis," as
70 Id.; see also Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development,
International Trade and Core Labour Standards, 3, Policy Brief (October 2000)
[hereinafter OECD Policy Brief] (noting, however, that the situation is different with
regard to certain other worker rights, finding that some States that did not comply with
non-core worker rights could occasionally gain a comparative advantage over those
States that did comply with non-core worker rights).
71 OECD Policy Brief, supra note 70, at 3.
72 ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, TRADE AND
STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT 23 (2005), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/58/40/34753254.pdf [hereinafter OECD TRADE AND
STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT].
73 For instance, Keith Maskus concludes that deficient provisions of core labor
standards generally diminish export competitiveness rather than improve it because of
the distorting effects of those deficiencies. Keith E. Maskus, Should Core Labor
Standards be Imposed Through International Trade Policy? (World Bank Working
Paper No. 1817, 1997), available at http://ctrc.sice.oas.org/geograph/labor/maskus.pdf;
see also, Keith E. Maskus, Trade and Competitiveness Aspects of Environmental and
Labor Standards in East Asia, in EAST ASIA INTEGRATES: A TRADE POLICY AGENDA FOR
SHARED GROWTH 163 (Kathie Krumm & Homi Kharas eds., 2004) (concluding that
improving protection of fundamental labor rights and environmental standards "would
not reduce [East Asia's] ability to export labor-intensive goods or pollution-intensive
goods; indeed, export growth can be compatible with raising core labor standards and
environmental protection."). Likewise, Rodrik finds some evidence that FDI is lower
than expected in countries with limited CLS. Dani Rodrik, Labor Standards in
International Trade: Do They Matter and What Do We Do About Them?, in Emerging
Agenda for Global Trade: High Stakes for Developing Countries 35, 57 (R. Lawrence et
al., 1996); see also David Kucera, The Effects of Core Workers Rights on Labor Costs
and Foreign Direct Investment: Evaluating the "Conventional Wisdom" (Int'l Labor
684
2012] AGREEMENT ON TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS OF LABOR
well as by ILO investigations, which find a positive correlation
between long-term economic success within the world trading
system and the observance of CLS.74 Indeed, the findings of the
OECD and ILO correspond with the conclusions of a World Bank
report published in 2001, stating: "Keeping labor standards low is
not an effective way of gaining a competitive advantage over
trading partners. Indeed low labor standards are likely to erode
competitiveness over time because they reduce incentives for
workers to improve skills and for firms to introduce labor saving
technology.""
Thus, three major international organizations and several
leading economists all conclude that the imposition of
fundamental worker rights can be pursued without necessarily
injuring a nation's capacity to effectively export and trade with the
world system. Furthermore, evidence suggests that many
developing countries have (in taking a myopic view of the issue)
completely ignored the benefits that acceptance of universal labor
Org., Discussion Paper 130). For a legal opinion and analysis, see Ernst-Ulrich
Petersmann, The Human Rights Approach Advocated by the U.N. High Commissioner
for Human Rights and by the ILO: Is It Relevant for WTO Law and Policy, 7 J. INT'L
EcoN. L. 605 (2004); Robert Howse & Ruti G. Teitel, Beyond the Divide: The Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the World Trade Organization, Dialogue
on Globalization, April 2007, available at http://library.fes.de/pdf-
files/iez/global/04572.pdf.
74 In general, the literature finds child labor detrimental to development since it
means that the next generation of workers will be unskilled and less well-educated;
curtailed innovation and productivity stymies society's and the economy's ability to
manage external shocks (such as financial crises and natural disasters) and may affect
foreign direct investment. See INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, THE FINANCIAL AND
ECONOMIC CRISIs: A DECENT WORK RESPONSE 52 (2009), available at
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/inst/download/tackling.pdf (stating that
maintaining labor standards helps support confidence and thus contributes to activating
the economy); INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, RULES OF THE GAME: A BRIEF
INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LABOR STANDARDS 9-10, 30 (2005) (describing the
value of CLS in protecting countries in times of economic crises, particularly during the
Asian financial crisis, and warning of the debilitative effects of child labor); OECD
Policy Brief, supra note 70, at 32; David Kucera, Core Labor Standards and Foreign
Direct Investment, 141 Int'l Lab. Rev. 31 (2002). See generally JANSEN LEE & EDDY
LEE, TRADE AND EMPLOYMENT-CHALLENGES FOR POLICY RESEARCH (2007), available
at http://www.oit.org/public/english/bureau/inst/download/eddy.pdf (giving general
background information on the topic).
75 Development Prospects Group, Global Economic Prospects and the Developing
Countries 82, World Bank (2001).
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standards could bring and the correlative role that acceptance
could play in the expansion of the world market.76
3. Core Labor Standards Suffer from Significant Under-
enforcement
Similar to the pre-TRIPS situation with regards to IPRs, CLS
suffer from significant under-enforcement, with the existing
international agency-that is, the ILO-seemingly impotent to
enforce standards and curb widespread violations."
Despite being the body responsible for the protection of CLS,
the ILO's enforcement record to date has proven to be consistently
inadequate. This is not due to lack of effort; the ILO has adopted
188 binding conventions and approximately 200 nonbinding
resolutions since its creation in 1919." While it is difficult to
pinpoint the precise reasons for the lack of enforcement, several
impediments can be identified. One such impediment is that the
ILO suffers from a disparate, and sometimes rather low, rate of
ratification of its treaties (including by leading developed
countries such as the United States)." This, in turn, creates a
"patchwork of inconsistent legal obligations" and serves as a
major impediment to the global enforcement of labor standards."o
76 See Narendar Pani, Who's Afraid of Labor Standards?, INDIAN ECON. TIMES,
Apr. 22, 1994, at 48 (noting that universal labor standards would improve the relative
attractiveness of India for foreign capital, and would also reduce the disadvantage of
competing with less democratic competitors from the developing world, such as China).
This is especially the case for developing country governments that already substantially
comply with CLS. See William J. Martin & Keith E. Maskus, The Economics of Core
Labor Standards: Implications for International Trade Policy, 9 REV. INT'L ECON. 317
(2001).
77 See International Organisation of Employers, The Evolving Debate on Trade &
Labor Standards 2-3 (2006) (stating that the real problem with labor issues is not the
laws on the books, but rather the enforcement of those laws).
78 ILO Conventions cover a wide range of areas, with the latest being the Work in
Fishing Convention of 2007. See Conventions, ILO,
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/convdispl.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2012).
79 Ratifications of the Fundamental Human Rights Conventions by Country, ILO
(Aug. 11, 2011, 10:00 PM), http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/docs/declprint.htm; see
also Edward Potter, The Growing Importance of the International Labor Organization:
The View From the United States, in GLOBALIZATION AND THE FUTURE OF LABOR LAW
(John D. Craig & Michael S. Lynk eds., 2006).
80 Chantal Thomas, Should the WTO Incorporate Labor and Environmental
Standards, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 348, 350 (2004). However, it should also be noted
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Moreover, a number of ILO conventions are ratified but not
implemented."1
Another impediment is that while in theory the ILO
Constitution authorizes sanctions in the event of non-compliance, 2
in practice the organization prefers to adopt a "soft" approach to
the enforcement of its norms, relying on public identification,
embarrassment and shaming, and technical assistance to promote
compliance." The ILO does not even do this very well, as the
ILO's "special list" of transgressions of CLS garners little
international publicity and even less government attention; in fact,
the list has not produced any substantial improvements in
compliance with CLS.
One recent example of the limitations of the ILO's
enforcement capacities is the ILO's response to Myanmar's use of
forced labor for both private and public purposes, which the ILO
"has been considering for over thirty years."84 In the case of
Myanmar, following a formal complaint by twenty-five worker
delegates, an ILO Commission of Inquiry investigated and found
extensive violations of the Forced Labor Convention, amounting
to a "saga of untold misery and suffering, oppression and
exploitation of large sections of the population inhabiting
Myanmar by the Government, military and other public
officers."" The Commission of Inquiry made several
recommendations, namely that Myanmar's government should
bring several of its laws into compliance with the Forced Labor
that those conventions dealing with CLS tend to have more uniform ratification.
81 Werner Sengenberger, International Labor Standards in the Globalized
Economy: Obstacles and Opportunities for Achieving Progress, in GLOBALIZATION AND
THE FUTURE OF LABOR LAw 331, 332 (John D. Craig & Michael S. Lynk eds., 2006).
82 Article 33 states that "the Governing Body may recommend to the Conference
such action as it may deem wise and expedient to secure compliance therewith." ILO
Constitution, ILO, http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/constq.htm (last visited Feb. 3,
2011).
83 Michael J. Trebilcock & Robert Howse, Trade Policy and Labor Standards, 14
MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 261, 274 (2005).
84 ILO, Report of the Commission of Inquiry Appointed Under Article 2 of the
Constitution of the International Labor Organization to Examine the Observance by
Myanmar of the Forced Labor Convention 1930 (No. 29), 543, ILO Official Bulletin,
Vol. 81 (Series B, Special Supp.) (July 2, 1998), available at
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/rehl/gb/docs/gb273/myanmar5.htm.
85 Id.
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Convention by May 1, 1999 at the latest; that Myanmar should
publicly renounce the practice of forced labor and take concrete
steps to eliminate it in all its forms; and that it should strictly
enforce a long-neglected provision of the Myanmar Penal Code
that provides for the prosecution and punishment of those who
exact forced labor." Importantly, the Governing Body took action
under Article 33 of the ILO Constitution and recommended, for
the first time in the ILO's history, that the International Labor
Conference "take such action as it may deem wise and expedient
to secure compliance" by Myanmar with the recommendations"
and with Myanmar's obligations under Convention Number 29 on
Forced Labor." Nonetheless, no ILO Member State actually
initiated any further sanctions (in large part due to concern that
such an effort would violate WTO rules).8 9 It was not until 2003
that the United States banned all trade with Myanmar under the
Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act.90  In passing the
legislation, members of the U.S. Congress argued in the face of
considerable opposition that sanctions were justified under Article
XX of the GATT.9' By contrast, a number of Member States,
including China and India, continued to engage with Myanmar
while the EU's and Australia's trade restrictions continued to
target only the military junta and their family members.92
Importantly, these sanctions cannot be considered a response to
86 Id 539-40.
87 Press Release, ILO News, Forced Labour Persists in Myanmar (Mar. 29, 2000),
available at
http://www.ilo.org/global/AbouttheILO/Mediaand_publicinformation/Pressrelease
s/lang--en/WCMS_007926/index.htm.
88 ILO, Convention Concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour, C29 Forced
Labour Convention, 14th Sess., June 28, 1930, available at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-
lex/convde.pl?C029.
89 See Brian A. Langille, What is International Labour Law For?, 3 L. & ETHICS OF
HUM. RTS. 47, 79 (2009) (arguing that the WTO constrains Members from using
economic sanctions to address abuses of human rights).
90 Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act, Pub. L. No. 108-6, 117 Stat. 864 (2003).
91 ROBERT HOWSE & MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE REGULATION OF
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 568 (3d ed. 2005).
92 Aung Din, Statement to the U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Religious Freedom, Democracy, Human Rights in Asia: Status of Implementation of the
Tibetan Policy Act, Block Burmese JADE Act, and North Korea Human Rights Act,
Hearing, June 2, 2011.
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the ILO Resolution, but rather to the repressive political
developments in Myanrnar in 2007, including the detention of
democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi. 93
Myanmar remains in non-compliance with the Convention and
the ILO continues to report that forced and compulsory labor
remains prevalent in many areas of the country in circumstances of
severe cruelty and brutality. 94 In November 2010, the ILO
reported that very few of the recommendations from the
Commission of Inquiry had been effectively implemented.9 5
Statistics on compliance with CLS provide further testimony
as to the need for a stronger enforcement mechanism. Simply put,
it is a generally accepted fact that large numbers of violations of
CLS occur everyday." For instance, the ILO estimates that 153
million children aged five to fourteen are engaged in child labor,
93 Id. at 2.
94 See Press Release, ILO News, ILO Conclusions on Myanmar Regarding Forced
Labour (June 18, 2004), available at http://www.ilo.org/asia/info/public/pr/lang--
en/WCMSBK PR_96 EN/index.htm. In 2007, the Understanding Between the
Government of the Union of Myanmar and the International Labor Office concerning the
appointment of an ILO Liaison Officer in Myanmar was secured. Press Release, ILO
News, Supplementary Understanding Between the Government of the Union of
Myanmar and the International Labour Office (Feb. 15, 2007), available at
http://www.ilo.org/yangon/info/WCMS 106131/lang--en/index.htm. The Understanding
provided that alleged victims of forced labor in Myanmar will have full freedom to
submit complaints to the ILO Liaison Officer in Yangon. Id. The Liaison Officer will
then make a confidential preliminary assessment as to whether a case involves forced
labor, so that such cases can be investigated by the Myanmar authorities and appropriate
action taken against the perpetrators. Id. Nonetheless, the ILO stated in July 2007 that,
despite the mechanism, there was still widespread use of forced labor in Burma. Id. The
issue of non-compliance was thus back on the agenda for the 97th ILO Session in May
2008 and the ILO. Press Release, ILO News, 97th International Labor Conference to
Address Wide Range of Issues, Including Reducing Rural Poverty, Enhancing Skills and
Labor Rights - Conference will have high-level discussion on food crisis (May 27,
2008), available at http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/press-and-media-
centre/news/WCMS_093673/lang--en/index.htm.
95 See Liaison Officer, Developments Concerning the Question of the Observance
by the Government ofMyanmar of the Forced Labor Convention, 1930 (No. 29) (Nov. 6,
2008), available at http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed norm/---
relconf/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_100325.pdf.
96 See, e.g., Director-General, Equality at Work: The Continuing Challenge Global
Report Under the Follow-up to the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and
Rights at Work, International Labor Conference (2011), available at
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed norm/---
relconf/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_154779.pdf.
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including an estimated fifty-three million in hazardous work.97
Furthermore, child labor makes up approximately 26% of the total
workforce in Africa, with one in four children engaged in child
labor (approximately sixty-five to eighty million children) and
15% of all Sub-Saharan African children engaged in some form of
hazardous work.98 In Asia, an estimated one in eight children are
child laborers, with a total of 5.6% of Asian children engaged in
hazardous work.9 9 Moreover, an OECD study found that only nine
out of sixty-seven non-OECD countries complied with the right to
freedom of association and fifteen out of sixty-seven countries
upheld the right to collective bargaining.'o It is also clear that
bonded labor continues to be widely practiced in several
countries,o'0 and that organizing and bargaining rights are
repressed or otherwise absent in export processing zones across
the world.'02 Indeed, this body of evidence led the OECD to
97 Director-General, Accelerating Action Against Child Labor, International Labor
Conference, 7 (September 2010), available at
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@dgreports/@dcomm/documents/publication/
wcms_126752.pdf. An ILO Report published in 2006 estimated that approximately 280
million children between the ages of five and fourteen worked on any given day in 2004,
with 126 million involved in hazardous work. ILO, The End of Child Labor: Within
Reach, 6 (2006), available at
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/ilc/ilc95/pdf/rep-i-b.pdf, see also
Commission Staff, Combating Child Labor, (European Commission, Working Paper
2010), available at
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2010/february/tradoc_145803.pdf On child labor
generally, see Frank Hagemann, Yacouba Diallo, Alex Etinne & Farhad Mehran, Global
Child Labour Trends 2000-2004, International Programme on the Elimination of Child
Labour (2006).
98 Accelerating Action Against Child Labor, supra note 97, at 10; The End of Child
Labor, supra note 97, at 8.
99 Accelerating Action Against Child Labor, supra note 97, at 10.
100 OECD TRADE AND STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT, supra note 72, at 66-67.
101 Director-General, The Cost of Coercion: Global Report under the Follow-Up to
the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, International Labor
Conference 1, 32 (2009), available at
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@ed-norm/@relconf/documents/meetingdocu
ment/wcms_106230.pdf (estimating that over 12.3 million people across the world were
in some sort of forced labor in 2005, including 9.4 million in Asia).
102 See Maskus, Should Core Labor Standards be Imposed, supra note 73; see also
Sarah Perman, Laurent Duvillier, Natacha David, John Eden & Samuel Grumiau, Behind
the Brand Names: Working Conditions and Labor Rights in Export Processing Zones
(2004), available at http://www.icftu.org/www/PDF/EPZreportE.pdf.
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conclude that there is "no indication in recent years of substantial
progress overall in reducing non-compliance with respect to
freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining
across the sample of sixty-nine countries that have ratified the two
corresponding ILO fundamental conventions."' 03
4. Core Labor Standards Are Inherently Deserving of
Protection
The fact that CLS are human rights is uncontroversial; no
Member State voted against the ILO Declaration when it was put
forth at the 86th Session of the General Conference of the ILO in
June, 1998.104 The ILO Declaration itself acknowledges CLS have
a special status within the international labor law hierarchy in that
the CLS are imposed upon ILO Members by virtue of them simply
being Members of the organization.o' Thus, Member States that
have not ratified the relevant conventions are nevertheless bound
to promote and realize the basic principles concerning the four
CLS.' 6 Regardless of this requirement, all of the respective seven
Conventions dealing with the standards currently enjoy almost
universal acceptance, with the highest rate of ratification among
all ILO conventions. The four principles are also broadly
articulated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
("UDHR"), the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights ("ICCPR"),o'0 the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights ("ICESCR"),'s and a number of other
103 OECD Policy Brief, supra note 70, at 3. For this reason, some scholars call for a
holistic approach to combat human rights violations encompassing the United Nations,
WTO, and other relevant stakeholders. See, e.g., Mihir Y. Kanade, A Pragmatic
Approach to International Trade-Human Rights Linkages (forthcoming 2011)
(manuscript at 3), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1694124.
104 See ILO Declaration, supra note 20, at 2.
105 See id
106 Id.
107 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]. Article 8 of the ICCPR prohibits forced or
compulsory labor, while Article 21(1) refers to the right "to freedom of association with
others, including the right to form and join trade unions for the protection of his
interests." Id.
108 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966,
993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR]. Article 7 of the ICESCR provides fair working
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key human rights conventions, which signify the commitment of
Members to protect workers on a much wider scale than that
proposed by the CLS. '
With such a high ratification rate and widespread endorsement
within the broader international human rights system, the CLS do
not simply constitute rights that belong to workers, but rather
constitute rights that belong to individuals as human beings.o10
Thus, child labor is prohibited not because the labor is cheaper
than adult labor, but rather because the growth and development of
children should not be undermined through labor; the operative
principle is that children should be shielded from the burdens of
labor, and concerns regarding the rate of pay a child receives are
irrelevant by comparison."' Similarly, forced labor is prohibited
not because it creates an economic distortion, but rather because it
denies workers their freedom." 2  While prohibition of
discrimination reaches beyond wage costs to protect workers'
equal right to work and the right to equal treatment as part of the
human right to be treated equally, freedom of association serves
broader political and social goals than merely permitting
unionization." 3
Given the above, any comparative advantage gained by non-
compliance with these standards is not an advantage that should be
shielded or trumped by liberalized trade. This is not a
controversial statement; in fact, the vast majority of countries
agree with such an edict.1 4 It is, therefore, extremely rare (if not
completely unheard of) for a trade representative to publicly state
conditions; Article 10 provides for the protection of children from social and economic
exploitation; Article 20, the right of association; Article 23(4), the right to join trade
unions; and Article 23(2), the right to work in a profession of one's choosing. Id.
109 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810
(1948) [hereinafter UDHR]. Article 4 of the UDHR prohibits slavery, while Article
25(2) provides for the special protection of childhood and Article 26 proclaims the right
to education. Id.; see also Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 32, Nov. 20, 1989,
1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (stating that children must be protected from exploitation).
I 10 Summers, supra note 6, at 68. The OECD has also accepted that the UDHR
rests firmly on accumulated principles of international human rights law. Id.
I Id. at 66.
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 See id
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that their country's comparative advantage is in child labor and the
prohibition of unionization."'
As human rights, the CLS are worthy of inclusion as a GATT-
protected norm. By viewing CLS as human rights and not merely
as an attempt to level the playing field, the case for the WTO
incorporating the rights and correspondingly playing a role in their
enforcement becomes clear for at least two reasons. First, when
viewed as basic human rights, CLS can be seen to be promoting
human freedom of choice. Such freedom of choice is entirely
consistent with a liberal trading regime that seeks to ensure other
human freedoms, particularly the right of individuals to engage in
market transactions without discrimination on the basis of country
of origin."6 Indeed, on a practical level, the sovereignty argument
does not stand up to scrutiny when one considers that all Members
of the WTO (including developing countries) allow some degree
of sovereignty erosion by virtue of membership in the organization
(or, in fact, by membership in any international organization). In
exchange for the reduced sovereignty, Member States receive the
benefits of membership in an organization which assists in making
trade more stable, predictable, and free, and in improving the
overall wealth of its citizens." 7
Second, the human rights approach shows that imposing trade
restrictions on products manufactured in a manner that fails to
comply with universally acknowledged human rights is not an
economic regulation per se, but rather a form of international
social regulation driven by the fundamental premise that human
rights are universal and indivisible. Viewed in this manner, it
becomes clear that the enforcement of human rights is not merely
a convenient opportunity to engage in protectionism, but an
obligation to respect, protect, and fulfill their responsibilities
under international human rights treaties, including the ILO
115 See Summers, supra note 6, at 66. (discussing the prohibition of child labor as a
human right).
116 Trebilcock & Howse, supra note 83, at 273.
117 For instance, members are required to limit tariff rates within their bound rate, to
apply trade remedy mechanisms within the parameters of certain substantive and
procedural rules, and to abide by and enforce certain intellectual property rights. Id.
Failure to observe and enforce any of these or other standards could lead to dispute
settlement and the possibility of retaliatory trade measures. See id.
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Declaration."' It is thus no answer to claim that the imposition of
trade restrictions for products manufactured in violation of CLS
interferes with the internal regulatory policy of another state; in
the contemporary world, human rights concerns are matters of
international, rather than domestic, concern. All states have an
interest in compelling compliance with human rights norms,
regardless of whether the violating state's conduct directly impacts
other states' interests in the traditional sense.l' As Michael
Trebilcock and Robert Howse observe, linking trade rights to
compliance with CLS will not impose a discriminatory set of
conditions on Members' exercise of their trading rights; rather, the
"condition" is, in effect, something that they are all already
committed to do, inasmuch as they are Members of the ILO and
signatories to the ICCPR and the ICESCR human rights treaties.'20
B. Textually-based Justifications for the Incorporation of
Core Labor Standards
In addition to satisfying the above four criteria as a subject
inherently worthy of WTO incorporation, there are several GATT-
based arguments which further support incorporation. Foremost,
an argument can be made that any panel or Appellate Body report
finding efforts to restrict or prohibit the importation of products
made in contravention of CLS inconsistent with the GATT would
undermine the sovereignty of the importing Member. While such
118 On this basis, it is not open for developing countries to argue that labor rights are
a luxury good which will improve as economic conditions develop. See id While this
may be true of low wages, the process of development cannot justify violation of core
human rights that are inherent and inalienable, regardless of the country's rate of
economic development.
119 Cleveland, supra note 68, at 160.
120 Trebilcock & Howse, supra note 83, at 289. The ILO Declaration obligates
members of the ILO to "respect, promote and realize in good faith" the four fundamental
rights, regardless of whether the member state has ratified the relevant ILO Conventions.
ILO Declaration, supra note 20, at 2. Clyde Summers observes in this context that it is
ironic that Egypt, Brazil, Indonesia, and Pakistan, which were among the most vocal
opposition to the Clinton proposal, have ratified conventions on all the subjects of the
ILO Declaration, with the sole exception being Pakistan's failure to ratify a convention
on child labor. Summers, supra note 6, at 67. It should be noted that the non-member
states to the ILO are as follows: Andorra, Monaco, Liechtenstein, Bhutan, North Korea,
Palau, Micronesia, Nauru, Tonga, Cook Islands, Niue, and Vatican City; of these, only
Liechtenstein and Tonga are members of the WTO, while Andorra and Vatican City
have observer status at the WTO. See ILO Declaration, supra note 20.
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an argument appears to turn the logic of the world trading system
on its head, it should be remembered that under human rights
principles states are legally entitled to disassociate themselves
from products manufactured in a manner that is contrary to their
international human rights obligations, as well as to refuse to
import such products in order to avoid further perpetuation of
those human rights violations.'2 1 Indeed, the clear and consistent
view of the U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights is that states must respect human rights, both within their
own country and abroad.122 Critically, this does not require the
exporting Member to comply with CLS; the Member remains free
to continue the practice for domestic consumption and for export
elsewhere. In addition, upon closer inspection, the GATT itself
recognizes the legitimacy of such an approach-far from creating
a general right of access to the markets of other Members, the
GATT merely imposes a negative right that access shall not be
restricted by discriminatory measures.12 3
The GATT/WTO regime does not support and has never
supported "free" trade; instead, what is promoted is a more
liberalized, "freer" trade in combination with principles of
security, predictability, and equality of opportunity.'24 Such aims
and objectives are reflected in numerous places in the WTO
agreements, notably in allowing safeguard measures to counter
purely legitimate trade in certain instances and in enumerated
121 This entitlement comes from the obligations imposed under the ILO. See Robert
Howse & Donald Regan, The Product/Process Distinction-An Illusory Basis for
Disciplining 'Unilateralism' in Trade Policy, 11 EUR. J. INT'L L. 249, 279 (2000).
122 See, e.g., U.N. Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, General
Comment 12, The Right to Adequate Food, Apr. 26-May 14, 1999, 20th Sess.,
E/C.12/1999/5 (May 12, 1999); U.N. Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights, General Comment 14, The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health,
Apr. 25-May 12, 2000, 22d Sess., E/C.12/2000/4 (Aug. 11, 2000); U.N. Committee on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, General Comment 15, The Right to Water, Nov.
11-29, 2002, 29th Sess., E/C.12/2002/11 (Jan. 20, 2003). To comply with their
international obligations in relation to the right to social security, States' parties have to
respect the enjoyment of the right by refraining from actions that interfere, directly or
indirectly, with the enjoyment of the right to social security in other countries. See U.N.
Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, General Comment 19, The Right
to Social Security, Nov. 5-23, 2007, 39th Sess., E/C.12/GC/19 (Nov. 23, 2007).
123 Howse & Regan, supra 121, at 257.
124 See WTO Agreement, supra note 2.
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exceptions (i.e., Article XX of the GATT).'25 The GATT/WTO
has also always recognized the balance between trade and
legitimate social values; for example, by allowing Members to
take measures to protect national historic treasures and national
security.126
When viewed in this manner, the incorporation of CLS into the
WTO framework is not a revolutionary concept, but more of an
extension of existing action. For instance, Article XX(e) of the
GATT reflects the drafters' consideration of workers' rights in
creating an exception from GATT commitments and obligations
for purposes "relating to . . . the products of prison labor." 27
Considering that the GATT was drafted in 1947 when coerced
labor was the only widely prohibited international human rights
norm, it is not a stretch to interpret the inclusion of Article XX(e)
as an indication of the original drafters' awareness of the need to
create an exception for the prevailing human rights norms of the
period when assessing compliance with the GATT.128  Such an
interpretation provides credence to the view that the GATT should
be read in such a way that it is compatible with contemporary
human rights norms. As such, it should come as no surprise that
there was a distinct absence of criticism from the delegates of the
WTO for the United States' unilateral ban against the import of
products produced in Myanmar in 2003, with the legislation not
even rating a mention at the U.S. Trade Policy Review at the
WTO. 129
The contrary position, which would not allow Members to take
trade-related measures to protect human rights, could potentially
produce some deeply disturbing results. Most irrationally, such a
position would mean that Members would be allowed to use trade
measures to target prison labor (as in Article XX(e) of the
GATT),130 but that trade measures targeting slave labor-which is
125 GATT, supra note 13, art. XX
126 Id. arts. XX(f), XXI.
127 Id. art. XX(e).
128 Cleveland, supra note 68, at 161.
129 HOWSE & TREBILCOCK, supra note 91, at 568.
130 Article XX(e) of the GATT states,
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination
between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction
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generally viewed a more egregious human rights abuse-would be
inconsistent with the GATT.13 ' Such an outcome is deeply
troublesome in the contemporary global environment where
concern for the protection of international human rights beyond
borders is widespread and systematic, and where an existing
international obligation to promote, protect, and fulfill basic
human rights and labor standards already exists.13 Given the good
faith obligation to comply with international obligations and the
WTO's recognition of CLS at the Singapore Ministerial
Conference, Gabrielle Marceau, Counselor at the Legal Affairs
Division of the World Trade Organization, poignantly
summarized:
[A]ll WTO members must comply with their human rights
obligations and with their WTO obligations at the same time
without letting a conflict arise between the two sets of
legislation. Hence, it is only reasonable to expect that the WTO
adjudicating bodies would interpret WTO provisions taking
account all relevant obligations of WTO disputing states.133
Indeed, if the WTO were to refuse to take into account legitimate
non-trade rules when assessing the validity of a restrictive trade
measure, the organization would in fact assume a fundamental role
in constraining the enforcement of a key global norm.'3 4
on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent
the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures ... relating to
prison labor.
GATT, supra note 13, art. XX.
131 Cleveland, supra note 68, at 147.
132 One clear example of this is the international community's use of sanctions
against the regime supporting apartheid in South Africa, as well as the international
community's decision to intervene in the conflict in the former Republic of Yugoslavia
for reasons relating to humanitarian concern. See Sanctions Against South Africa,
Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (1986)
http://eca.state.gov/education/engteaching/pubs/AmLnC/br56.htm (last visited Feb. 3,
2012); Jan Nederveen Pieterse, Sociology of Humanitarian Intervention: Bosnia,
Rwanda and Somalia Compared, 18 INT'L POL. Sci. REV. 71, 79-83.
133 Marceau, supra note 12, at 234; see also Gabrielle Marceau, Trade and Labor, in
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 541-42 (Daniel Bethlehem,
Donald McRae, Rodney Neufeld, & Isabelle Van Damme eds., 2009).
134 See Marceau, supra note 12, at 202.
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The WTO has not approached human health similarly, which
the WTO has supported and protected in two distinct ways. First,
the WTO has promoted the protection of human health over any
trade concerns on the issue of access to medicines in the
developing world.' " These efforts began with the Doha
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, which
reiterated the importance of the issue and re-affirmed both the
flexibilities existing within the TRIPS Agreement and the fact that
the Agreement "does not and should not prevent Members from
taking measures to protect public health."' 3 6  The Doha
Declaration also recognized that Members with "insufficient or no
manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector could face
difficulties in making effective use of compulsory licensing under
the TRIPS Agreement" and instructed Members to find an
"expeditious solution to th[e] problem." 37
The solution came on August 30, 2003 in the form of a waiver
that created a mechanism whereby Members can issue compulsory
licenses to export generic versions of patented pharmaceuticals to
Members with "insufficient or no manufacturing capacity in the
pharmaceutical sector for the product(s) in question."' The
importing Member must also be issued a compulsory license in
accordance with certain conditions. 3 9 In 2005, Members agreed
135 World Trade Organization, Ministerial Conference Declaration on the TRIPS
Agreement and Public Health of 14 November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, T 4,
available at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/ministe/min01_e/mindecl-tripse.htm
[hereinafter Doha TRIPS Declaration].
136 Id. 4-5.
'37 Id. 6.
138 World Trade Organization, Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health of 1 Sept. 2003, WT/L/540 and
Corr.1, T 2(A)(ii), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/trips e/implem-para6_e.htm [hereinafter Paragraph
6 of Doha Declaration].
139 Id. 1 3; see also World Trade Organization, General Council Chairperson's
Statement of 13 Nov. 2003, WT/GC/M/82, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/trips e/gcstat 30aug03_e.htm (discussing the
reasons for the implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS
Agreement and Public Health). This decision has sparked much discussion, comment,
and criticism. See generally Duncan Matthews, WTO Decision on Implementation of
Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health: A
Solution to the Access to Essential Medicines Problem?, 7 J. INT'L ECON. L. 73, 73
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to permanently amend the TRIPS Agreement to include the
waiver.14 0  The value of this action cannot be overstated, as the
GATT/WTO had never before agreed to amend any of its covered
agreements.
The DSB also has a proven track record in promoting the
protection of human health. For instance, while the panel in EC-
Asbestos found the European Communities' measure banning the
importation and sale of asbestos a violation of Article 111.4, but
justified it under Article XX(b) as a measure "necessary" to
protect human life or health, the Appellate Body approach gave
even greater weight to human health.14 ' More specifically, the
Appellate Body included the health risks of asbestos into its "like
product" analysis of Article 111.4, concluding that asbestos fibers
were not "like" PVA, cellulose, and glass fibers.142
Likewise, both the panel and Appellate Body in Brazil-Tyres
accepted Brazil's argument that its measure banning the
importation and use of retreaded tires fit within the scope of
Article XX(b) as being "necessary to protect human, animal and
plant life" due to the threat posed by the accumulation of
discarded tires, given that the tires provided a breeding ground for
mosquitoes (which carry diseases) and released harmful toxins
("Compulsory licensing is one of a range of policy approaches that will ultimately assist
in improving access to essential medicines in developing countries," and that "the debate
about the Doha Declaration and compulsory licensing is part of a much wider problem
and the solution requires a mix of policy initiatives."); Bryan Mercurio, TRIPS, Patents
and Access to Life-Saving Drugs in the Developing World, 8 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L.
REv. 211, 214-15 (2004) (arguing that, because the "majority of the drugs used to
combat public health epidemics such as HIV/AIDS and malaria are off-patent or not
patented in many developing countries and LDCS, the agreement will do very little to
assist those nations in preventing and treating public health crises and epidemics," and
that there are other important considerations that were not addressed by the agreement.);
Frederick M. Abbott & Rudolf V. Van Puymbroeck, Compulsory Licensing for Public
Health: A Guide and Model Documents for Implementation of the Doha Declaration
Paragraph 6 Decision (World Bank, Working Paper No 61, 2005) (providing a guide to
compulsory licensing and fleshing out the implications of the declaration).
140 World Trade Organization General Counsel, Amendment of the TRIPS
Agreement: Decision of 6 December 2005 WT/L/641 (Dec. 8, 2005).
141 Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Measures Affecting Asbestos
and Asbestos-Containing Products TT 113-116, WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001)
[hereinafter E. C. -Asbestos].
142 See id. T110-116, 125-26.
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into the air when burned.143  While the Brazilian measure was
ultimately deemed not to satisfy the chapeau to Article XX, 144 the
panel and Appellate Body's analysis of whether the measure was
"necessary" for the "protection of human, animal and plant life" or
health were deferential to Brazil's view. 145  These decisions
indicate the willingness of WTO panels and the Appellate Body to
provide Members with a wide scope in crafting measures for the
protection of human, animal, and plant life and health; it is only
when such measures become discriminatory that the measures will
be deemed to be inconsistent with the GATT.
A similar pattern can be seen with regard to the environment,
where WTO panels and the Appellate Body demonstrate a
willingness to apply an almost deferential standard to the issue of
whether a Member's conduct fits within the scope of Article
XX(g) as "relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural
resources." 46 For instance, the Appellate Body in U.S.-Gasoline
found that U.S. measures promulgated as part of the U.S. Clean
Air Act on the composition and emission effects of gasoline-
including the requirement that certain areas of the United States
sell only "reformulated gasoline" (a cleaner-burning fuel) to
consumers and other areas sell gasoline no dirtier than that sold in
1990147 -is 'related to" the "conservation of an exhaustible
natural resource" (in this case, clean air) and therefore within the
143 See Appellate Body Report, Brazil-Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded
Tyres, 163-65, 212, WT/DS332/AB/R, (Dec. 3, 2007),
www.wto.org/english/tratope/dispue/332abr e.pdf [hereinafter Brazil-Tyres].
144 See id 252. The Brazilian measures ultimately failed to satisfy the conditions
of the chapeau to Article XX for two reasons: first, "the MERCOSUR exemption has
resulted in the Import Ban being applied in a manner that constitutes arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination," and second, "the imports of used tyres through court
injunctions ... resulted in the Import Ban being applied in a manner that constitutes
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination." See id TT 224-33, 240-246.
145 See id. 170 ("Brazil's chosen level of protection is the reduction of [these] risks
... to the maximum extent possible, and that a measure or practice will not be viewed as
an alternative unless it preserve[s] for the responding Member its right to achieve its
desired level of protection with respect to the objective pursued.") (internal quotations
omitted).
146 GATT, supra note 13, at art. XX.
147 Appellate Body Report, United States-Standard for Reformulated and
Conventional Gasoline, 4, WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 29, 1996) [hereinafter U.S.-Gasoline].
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scope of Article XX(g).' 48 Similar to the result in Brazil-Tyres,149
certain aspects of the application of the measure constituted
"unjustifiable discrimination" against foreign refiners and a
"disguised restriction on international trade," and therefore failed
to satisfy the requirements of the chapeau to Article XX.so
The Appellate Body report in U.S.-Shrimp demonstrated an
even more deferential approach when it found that U.S. measures
forcing foreign shrimp trawlers to reduce incidental "take-rates" of
migratory sea turtles (essentially through the use of costly "turtle
excluder devices") were "relat[ed] to the conservation of an
exhaustible natural resource" (in this case, migratory sea
turtles)."' In finding a live animal species to be an exhaustible
natural resource, the Appellate Body stated that "living resources
are just as finite as petroleum, iron ore and other non-living
resources."l5 2 The Appellate Body justified its interpretation by
stating that the textual language of Article XX(g) must be
interpreted "in light of [the] contemporary concerns of the
community nations about the protection and conservation of the
environment."'5 3 Moreover, the Appellate Body pointed to the
mention of "sustainable development" in the preamble of the
WTO Agreement as evidence that Members were "fully aware of
the importance and legitimacy of environmental protection as a
goal of national and international policy."'54 The Appellate Body
also pointed to other "modern [non-WTO] international
conventions and declarations [which] make frequent references to
natural resources as embracing both living and non-living
148 See id. at 19.
149 See Brazil-Tyres, supra note 143, 1 252.
150 See U.S-Gasoline, supra note 147, at 28-29. In short, the U.S. measures treated
foreign refiners less favorably than domestic refiners as domestic refiners in operation
for at least six months in 1990 could establish individual refinery baselines, which
represented the quality of gasoline produced by that refiner in 1990, while foreign
refiners in operation for at least six months in 1990 were assigned a statutory baseline
established by the Environmental Protection Agency (reflecting average U.S. gasoline
quality in 1990). See id. at 5-6.
151 US.-Shrimp, supra note 14, TT 2-4, 141-42.
152 Id 128.
153 Id. 129.
154 Id.
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resources." 55  Like U.S.-Gasoline, the U.S. measures were
ultimately found to constitute "unjustifiable discrimination"
against foreign trawlers and a "disguised restriction on
international trade," and therefore failed to satisfy the
requirements of the chapeau to Article XX.156  Importantly,
however, the Appellate Body detailed the unjustifiable and
discriminatory aspects of the measure and essentially provided a
roadmap to the United States for coming into compliance with the
decision.' The United States subsequently revised these
measures, which were then found to be consistent with Article
XX(g) of the GATT, including the chapeau.'
While the WTO's actions and jurisprudence relating to the
above issues are imperfect and have been subjected to criticism,
the WTO has unquestionably taken steps towards realizing the
importance of and further protecting norms concerning human
health and the environment. To date, this has not been the case
with human rights'5 9 and, by association, CLS. Thus, not only
have the WTO and its Members failed to appreciate the ethically
desirable results that could flow from the incorporation of
universal human rights into the WTO's interpretative architecture,
but they have also failed to capitalize on the potential public
legitimacy gains to be realized with the incorporation of CLS.160
More importantly, the WTO and its Members have failed in their
legal obligation to "interpret and apply WTO rules in conformity
with the human rights obligations of WTO Members under
international law."' 6 ' For these reasons, one has to ask whether
the WTO has become a "shelter to protect human rights
155 Id. 1 130.
156 See US.-Shrimp, supra note 14, 186.
157 See id T 160-186.
158 See Panel Report, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and
Shrimp Products, Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia, l 5.142-44, 6.1,
WT/DS58/RW (June 15, 2001).
159 See Caroline Dommen, Safeguarding the Legitimacy of the Multilateral Trading
System: The Role of Human Rights Law, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND HUMAN RIGHTS:
FOUNDATIONS AND CONCEPTUAL ISSUES 125 (Fredrick M. Abbott et al. eds., 2006).
160 See id. at 125-130.
161 See International Law Association, International Trade Law, Conference
Resolution, No. 5/2008 (Aug. 2008), available at http://www.ila-
hq.org/en/committees/index.cfm/cid/24.
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violators[.]"l6 2
This is not to suggest that human rights should trump trade law
or that evidence of a single breach of a core labor right should
allow a trading partner to immediately suspend its existing
international trade concessions. Instead, what we propose is
substantially less ambitious-the WTO should not automatically
consider the pursuit of human rights objectives through trade
measures an illegitimate burden on trade. As one of the leading
(and most successful) international organizations, the WTO should
not simply state that labor and human rights issues belong
elsewhere; rather, it should recognize that compliance with
universal human rights standards is a legitimate and worthy
objective that should be taken into account in assessing the
validity of a trade restriction that counterbalances the losses
resulting from the exporting country's failure to apply CLS. The
following section evaluates several models for the incorporation of
CLS into the WTO.
III. Incorporation of CLS - How It Would Work
Despite the economic, moral, and legal justifications for the
incorporation of CLS into the WTO, developing countries
continue to fear that the imposition of trade barriers for violations
of CLS could be used in a protectionist manner.163 This fear could
threaten to undermine the entire multilateral trading regime, and it
is therefore essential that any model incorporating CLS into the
WTO adequately address this protectionist concern.
The remaining portion of this section is separated into three
subsections: Subsection A discusses potential incorporation of
CLS into the WTO by "judicial" means; Subsection B discusses
incorporation by "legislative" means; and Subsection C evaluates
the options and offers the preferred model for incorporation.
A. Incorporating CLS by "Judicial" Means
This subsection evaluates two different interpretive approaches
that Panels and the Appellate Body could take as a way of
incorporating CLS into the WTO framework. Under the first
approach, production differences in determining the "likeness" of
162 See Cleveland, Supra note 68, at 148.
163 See Langille, supra note 64, at 31.
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products could be accounted for. Under the second approach, CLS
could be incorporated as an exception under Article XX of the
GATT. Each is discussed in turn.
1. Model One: Unravel the Process and Production
Method ("PPM') Distinction
The first option for the incorporation of CLS into the WTO
would allow for the validation of unilateral trade measures to
restrict imports made in violation of CLS simply by finding that
such products are not "like" products.'6 4 In other words, since the
use of child labor can be determined by objective criteria
recognized by international human rights law, goods that are made
with child labor can be distinguished from those that are made
without; thus, treating the importation of such products differently
cannot be said to be inconsistent with the non-discrimination
provisions contained in Article 1165 or Article III of the GATT.16 6
Simply stated, the standards would be inapplicable as the principle
of non-discrimination only extends to "like" products.167
164 See infra text accompanying notes 166 and 167 for a more thorough explanation
of the "likeness" standard.
165 See GATT, supra note 13, art. 1.1 ("[A]ny advantage, favour, privilege, or
immunity granted by any contracting party to any product originating in or destined for
any other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product
originating in or destined for the territories of all other contracting parties." (emphasis
added)).
166 See id art. 111.4 ("The products of the territory of any contracting party imported
into the territory of any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less
favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin in respect of all laws,
regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase,
transportation, distribution or use.").
167 The test to determine "likeness" is slightly different depending upon the GATT
provision at issue. For analysis under Article 111.2, see Panel Report, Korea - Taxes on
Alcoholic Beverages WT/DS75/R, 10.103-.104 (Sept. 17, 1998), available at
http://www.worldtradelaw.net/reports/wtopanels/korea-alcohol(panel).pdf; Panel Report,
Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS8/R, WT/DS10/R, WT/DSI1 /R, 6.20-
6.23 (July 11, 1996), available at
http://www.worldtradelaw.net/reports/wtopanels/japan-alcohol(panel).pdf; Panel Report,
United States - Taxes on Automobiles, DS31/R, 5.4-5.10, GATT (Oct. 11, 1994)
(unadapted), available at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/reports/gattpanels/us-
autotaxes.pdf [hereinafter US. - Taxes on Automobiles]. For analysis under Article
111.4, see E.C.-Asbestos, supra note 141, T 93-154. For analysis under Article I, see
Panel Report, Canada/Japan - Tariff on Imports of Spruce, Pine, Fir (SPF) Dimension
Lumber, TT 5.6-5.16, L/6470 - 36S/167 (Apr. 26, 1989), available at
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While such a model relies upon the WTO explicitly
considering other rules of international law, including those
surrounding the agreements the respective parties have signed
concerning the protection of CLS, this by itself does not inherently
conflict with current WTO practice. In fact, "WTO panels and the
Appellate Body have applied other rules of international law
independently of construing a given WTO provision."' 6 8 Given
this background, it seems possible for a respondent Member
defending its restriction on the importation of goods produced by
child labor to rely on the ILO Declaration in support of its claim
that, under international law, such a product is not "like" a product
produced in a CLS-compliant manner. Critically, this model
would not allow labor rights to "trump" trade rights in case of
conflict; rather, it would encourage a broad interpretation of WTO
provisions to facilitate compatibility with obligations under
international labor rights law.
A review of the GATT/WTO jurisprudence, however, leaves
one doubtful of whether a panel or the Appellate Body would
adopt such a nuanced interpretation of "like" products under
Article I and III. For example, the GATT panel in U.S.-Tuna
maintained that "like" products are those which are alike in their
physical properties regardless of their processing histories.' It is
questionable, however, whether this GATT panel report remains
good law. For instance, the Appellate Body in E.C.-Asbestos
neither endorsed nor rejected the assertion that process and
production methods are relevant for an assessment of likeness,o70
but did hold that potential health risks should be included as a
relevant factor when determining likeness under Article 111.4.171
The Appellate Body's novel approach to determining "likeness"
also "strongly suggests" differentiation "based on consumer tastes
http://www.worldtradelaw.net/reports/gattpanels/spflumber.pdf; Panel Report, Spain -
Tariff Treatment on Unroasted Coffee, f 4.5-4.9, L/5135 - 28S/102 (Apr. 27, 1981),
available at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/reports/gattpanels/spaincoffee.pdf.
168 See Joost Pauwelyn, The Role ofPublic International Law in the WTO: How Far
Can We Go?, 95 AM. J. INT'L L., 535, 563 (2001).
169 See Panel Report, United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, 11 5.8-5.10,
DS29/R (June 16, 1994), 33 I.L.M. 839, 889 (1994) [hereinafter U.S.-Tuna].
170 See E.C.-Asbestos, supra note 141, 5 84-148.
171 See id
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and habits."' 72
While the Appellate Body report in E.C. -Asbestos advanced
the jurisprudence, its applicability to the incorporation of CLS is
limited. Simply stated, products may have the same physical
characteristics whether or not they are made in accordance with
CLS.17 Thus, the factual basis for the Appellate Body's reasoning
in E.C.-Asbestos can be distinguished from those in which there is
a potential dispute over CLS.
While the product/process distinction might pose a challenge
to incorporating CLS, there are strong reasons to find that the text
of the GATT does not support it.174 Interpreting the text of the
GATT in accordance with Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties ("VCLT"),17 5 one could plausibly find that
origin-neutral discrimination of how a product is made is
supported by the GATT, while trade restrictions based on where a
product is made constitutes discrimination (as per, for instance,
Articles I and/or III).176 Howse and Regan adopt such an
interpretation, arguing that "like" in the GATT actually means
"not differing in any respect relevant to an actual non-protectionist
policy."'77 Such an interpretation draws support from at least two
earlier GATT disputes concerning Article III as applied to
regulatory taxes, both of which found that whether "like" products
were treated alike depends on the regulatory purpose being
considered.'7 ' Furthermore, abandoning the product/process
172 See Trebilcock & Howse, supra note 83, at 288.
173 It is of note that there has been a rise in public support for 'ethical products' in
recent years. For instance, there was a high level of public support for a boycott of
soccer balls produced in Pakistan by child labor, which ultimately led to reform in the
relevant factory. See Pakistan Soccer Ball Industry Seeks End to Child Labor, CNN
WORLD (Apr. 8, 1998), http://articles.cnn.com/1998-04-
08/world/9804_08pakistan.soccer-1Ichild-labor-soccer-ball-
factories?_s=PM:WORLD.
174 But see John H. Jackson, Comments on Shrimp/Turtle and the Product/Process
Distinction, II J. INT'L L. 303, 303-04 (2000).
175 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, G.A. Res. 18232, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.39/11 /Add.2, (Jan. 27, 1980), available at
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetailsIll.aspx?&src=UNTSONLINE&mtdsgno=XXII
I1-&chapter=23&Temp=mtdsg3&lang=en.
176 See Howse & Regan, supra note 121, at 269-72.
17 See id at 260-62.
178 See U.S. - Taxes on Automobiles, supra note 167, 1 5.5- 5.10 (Oct. 11, 1994);
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distinction would not unduly create and expand loopholes
available for Members to circumvent their GATT obligations, as
any assessment of a process-based import restriction would have
to ensure that it was not being applied in such a way that affords
protection to the domestic industry, taking into account both the
timing of the measure and the effect it has on similar industries
within the Member state."'
Even if products manufactured in compliance with CLS were
found to be "like" products produced in violation of CLS, an
evolutionary interpretive approach could still lead to a finding
consistent with Articles I and III of the GATT. For example, the
panel in Canada-Autos held that origin-neutral conditions were
permissible and thus not inconsistent with Article I of the
GATT.'"0  Under such an approach, an origin-neutral, non-
discriminatory condition relating to the CLS may be viewed as
consistent with Article I. 1 of the GATT, even if the product
manufactured in violation of CLS is considered a "like" product.
Similar reasoning can be applied to Article III, where one could
argue that, as virtually all WTO Members are also Members of the
ILO (and thus already obligated to respect and protect the CLS),
there is no difference in treatment between a group of domestic
products and a group of "like" imported products-thus allowing
for less favorable treatment to the imported products.'82
Panel Report, United States - Measures Affecting Alcohol and Malt Beverages, TT 5.72-
5.74, DS23/R- 39S/206, (June 19, 1992), available at
http://www.worldtradelaw.net/reports/gattpanels/usmaltbeverages.pdf.
179 See Trebilcock & Howse, supra note 83, at 289.
180 See Panel Report, Canada - Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive
Industry, 10.22-10.25, 10.39-10.40, WT/DS139/R, WT/DS142/R, (Feb. 11, 2000),
available at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/reports/wtopanels/canada-autos(panel).pdf
[hereinafter Canada-Autos] ("We therefore do not believe that, as argued by Japan, the
word 'unconditionally' in Article 1.1 must be interpreted to mean that making an
advantage conditional on criteria not related to the imported product itself is per se
inconsistent with Article 1. 1, irrespective of whether and how such criteria relate to the
origin of the imported products.").
181 See Trebilcock & Howse, supra note 83, at 287-88; Trade and Labor, supra note
133, at 547-48. But see Report Adopted by the Contracting Parties, Belgium Family
Allowances, G/32 - 15/59 (Nov. 6, 1952), available at
http://www.worldtradelaw.net/reports/gattpanels/belgianfamilyallowances.pdf.
182 See E.C.-Asbestos, supra note 141, 100; see also Panel Reports, European
Communities-Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products,
7.2509-2516, WT/DS291/RWT/DS292/R, WT/DS293/R, (Sept. 29, 2006); Appellate
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We understand that the above reasoning departs from current
WTO jurisprudence on discrimination, but nevertheless, the
product/process distinction is not in accordance with the text of the
GATT; thus, production method can be a factor in determining the
"likeness" of products. We further argue that even if products
produced in accordance with CLS are found to be "like" products
produced in violation of CLS, it would not necessarily constitute
"discrimination" to find the latter to be in violation of Article I or
III of the GATT.'
2. Model Two: Incorporation through Article XX
Exceptions
This should be considered a fall-back position in the event that
differentiating between the conditions under which a product is
produced is found to violate the non-discrimination provisions
contained in the GATT, where differing treatment can be
considered a justified exception under Article XX(a) of the
GATT 84 as a measure necessary for the protection of "public
morals.""' For example, the Appellate Body in U.S.-Gambling
accepted America's submission that its ban on internet gambling
Body Report, Dominican Republic - Measures Affecting the Importation and Sale of
Cigarettes, T 7.298, WT/DS302/AB/R, (Nov. 26, 2004), available at
http://www.worldtradelaw.net/reports/wtopanels/dr-cigarettes(panel).pdf;
Trebilcock & Howse, supra note 833, 288-89.
183 Provided, of course, that measures target products made in violation of CLS
from all countries. If measures targeted some but not all, it is likely that members would
be found to be in violation of Article I of the GATT.
184 See GATT, supra note 13, art. XX, which states:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination
between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction
on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent
the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures:
(a) necessary to protect public morals;
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health.
185 See id. It could also be argued that the measure is necessary to protect 'human
life and health' under Article XX(b). However, this argument is less likely to be
successful given that the human life and health to be protected is in the territory of the
exporting member as opposed to that of the importing member. While we will not
address the point here, it could be argued that exceptions to measures 'relating to the
products of prison labor' under Article XX(e) could be read so as to include products
made in violation of the CLS. See id.
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was provisionally justified under Article XIV(a) of the GATS (the
equivalent to Article XX(a) of the GATT) as being designed to
protect public morals and maintain public order.186 In so doing,
the Appellate Body seemingly agreed with the Panel that "the term
public morals denotes standards of right and wrong conduct
maintained by or on behalf of a community or nation,"'" and that
the "definition of the word 'order,' read together with footnote 5
[of the GATS], suggests that 'public order' refers to the
preservation of the fundamental interests of a society, as reflected
in public policy and law."'88
Other examples could include the prohibition on the
importation and sale of alcohol or pornography. Given this, it is
plausible that Article XX(a) could be interpreted in a manner
which allows Members to differentiate between goods on the basis
of whether they were made in a manner consistent with CLS.1'
Professor Howse argues that "the interpretation of public morals
should not be frozen in time," and "with the evolution of human
rights as a core element in public morality in many post-war
societies, the content of public morals extends to include"
measures aimed at inducing compliance with universal core labor
rights. 0
186 See Panel Report, United States - Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply
of Gambling and Betting Services, % 6.461- 6.493, WT/DS285/AB/R (Nov. 10, 2004),
available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/dispue/285r e.pdf.
187 See id.16.465.
188 See id 1 6.467.
189 See Robert Howse, The World Trading Organization and the Protection of
Workers'Rights, 3 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 131, 143-44 (1999). Professor Howse
states:
Even if one thinks that Article XX(a) is somehow limited to matters such as the
regulation of pornography, imposing a limitation on its scope to measures on
"products" would prevent a country from banning imports of pornographic
films made with children or involving (but not necessarily depicting)
involuntary acts of sex and other illegal violence. One has only to think of this
example to see how unduly and irrationally restrictive of the ability of members
to protect public morals Article XX(a) would be if it excluded PPM-based
measures. Indeed, unless independently harmful, any product manufactured in
the context of racketeering or organized criine would have to be given the full
protection of GATT!
190 See id at 142; see also Trebilcock & Howse, supra note 83, at 289-90. But see
Carlos Manuel Vasquez, Trade Sanctions and Human Rights-Past, Present, and
Future, 6 J. INT'L ECON. L. 797, 819 (2003) ("The attempt to read these articles as
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Interpreting Article XX(a) to allow for the prohibition of the
importation and sale of products manufactured in violation of CLS
would allow importing nations to protect their citizens from an
internationally condemned practice which offends both deeply
held beliefs and core values of their citizens. In this regard, FTAs
are being utilized to ensure that certain labor standards are deemed
to fall within the scope of the "public morals" exception. For
example, footnote 1 of Article 224(1) of the EU-CARIFORUM
FTA reads: "The Parties agree that. . . measures necessary to
combat child labor shall be deemed to be included within the
meaning of measures necessary to protect public morals or
measures necessary for the protection of health."' 9'
Furthermore, interpreting "public morals" to include CLS
would adhere to the Appellate Body's acknowledgement in its first
report that the GATT "is not to be read in clinical isolation from
public international law."' 9 2 Moreover, Article 31(3)(c) of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties directs treaty
interpreters to use "[a]ny relevant rules of international law
applicable in the relations between the parties [to the WTO]" as
relevant legal context for interpreting provisions of the WTO.19 3
In practice, this means that panels and the Appellate Body must,
when necessary, draw on provisions and principles found in other
international treaties to assist in the interpretation of WTO
provisions. Such usage of other international treaties occurred in
U.S.-Shrimp, where the Appellate Body considered an assortment
of international environmental agreements (even though not all
WTO Members had ratified all of these agreements) when
attempting to define the term "exhaustible natural resources"
permitting states to impose outwardly directed measures if, but only if, a violation of
international human rights norms is the predicate for the trade measure strikes me as an
attempt to fit a square peg into a round hole.").
191 See EU-CARIFORUM, supra note 60, at art. 224, 1, n.1.
192 See United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, art.
31, 1, WT/DS2/AB/R (Mar. 20, 1996). See generally Andrew D. Mitchell and David
Heaton, The Inherent Jurisdiction of WTO Tribunals: The Select Application of Public
International Law Required by the Judicial Function, 31 MICH. J. INT'L L. 561 (2010)
(discussing and analyzing the application of public international law in WTO dispute
settlement).
193 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 175, art. 31.3(c).
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contained in Article XX(g). 194 In So doing, the Appellate Body
specifically stated that the terms of a treaty must be read "in the
light of contemporary concerns of the community of nations about
the protection and conservation of the environment."l9 5
A similarly "dynamic" interpretation of Article XX(a) that
incorporates measures aimed at inducing compliance with CLS is
possible, particularly given that all the parties to the WTO
explicitly endorsed the norms contained in the ILO Declaration at
the 1996 Singapore Ministerial. 19 6 While some argue that such an
interpretative methodology is contrary to the Dispute Settlement
Understanding ("DSU"), this argument cannot be sustained. The
DSU only limits the applicable law before the panel and Appellate
Body;' 9 thus, a party could invoke a non-WTO rule or treaty to
substantiate a trade restriction based on Article XX(a) if it could
be shown that that party as well as the complainant party was
194 U.S -Shrimp, supra note 14, 133.
195 Id. T 129.
196 See Howse & Regan, supra note 121. Kolben, however, questions whether the
need to rely on a "dynamic" interpretation "might be stretching both the original intent
and contemporary conceptions of the clause." Kevin Kolben, The WTO Distraction, 21
STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 461, 478 (2010). The relevant part of the Singapore Ministerial
Declaration reads, in full:
We renew our commitment to the observance of internationally recognized core
labor standards. The International Labor Organization (ILO) is the competent
body to set and deal with these standards, and we affirm our support for its work
in promoting them. We believe that economic growth and development fostered
by increased trade and further trade liberalisation contribute to the promotion of
these standards. We reject the use of labor standards for protectionist purposes,
and agree that the comparative advantage of countries, particularly low-wage
developing countries, must in no way be put into question. In this regard, we
note that the WTO and the ILO Secretariats will continue their existing
collaboration.
For a discussion of this, see Hughes & Wilkinson, supra note 36, at 375.
197 See Understanding Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes,
art. 3.2, Apr. 15, 1994. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 2, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter DSU]. Joost Pauwelyn's
discussion of the terms of the DSU notes that,
[U]nlike the [Law of the Sea] Convention and the Statute of the ICJ, the DSU
does not include an explicit provision on 'applicable law.' . . . [N]othing in the
DSU or any other WTO rule precludes panels from addressing and, as the case
may be, applying other rules of international law so as to decide the WTO
claims before them.
Pauwelyn, supra note 168, at 561.
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bound by the rule. Given that virtually all WTO Members are
signatories to the ILO Declaration and all Members explicitly
endorsed the principles enshrined at the Singapore Ministerial,
there should be no impediment to reliance on the ILO Declaration
in WTO dispute proceedings.19 8
Moreover, the panel could, under Article 13 of the DSU, invite
the ILO to provide evidence of where the consensus lies and what
practices constitute an unambiguous violation of the universal
content of the rights contained in the ILO Declaration.199
Specifically, Article 13(1) grants panels the "right to seek
information and technical advice from any individual or body
which it deems appropriate," while Article 13(2) provides that a
panel "may seek information from any relevant source and may
consult experts to obtain their opinion on certain aspects of the
matter." 20 0 With respect to a factual issue concerning a scientific
or other technical matter raised by a party to a dispute, a panel
may request an advisory report in writing from an expert review
group. 201
Through these provisions, the ILO may, for instance, indicate
that there is a relative consensus that employing children under the
age of six constitutes a violation of the prohibition on child labor,
while noting that there is controversy and no consensus as to
whether fourteen-year-old children working is a violation of the
ILO Declaration. In the former case, such evidence would support
a determination that unilateral trade restrictions are permitted,
whereas in the latter case, the evidence may support a finding that
the measure constitutes an unjustifiable burden that is inconsistent
with the GATT. In other words, the possibility of such a co-
operative approach with the ILO indicates that concerns over the
justifiability of the CLS, and the appropriateness of the WTO in
interpreting the content of those rights, are misplaced.
Further, it must be remembered that neither "the basic purpose
or structure of Article XX renders it inapplicable" to trade
restrictive measures based on production methods. Such a view is
explicitly supported by the inclusion of Article XX(e), which
198 See id. at 576.
199 See DSU, supra note 197, at art. 13.
200 Id.
201 See Howse & Regan, supra note 12 1, at 143.
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allows Members to take restrictive trade measures against products
made with prison labor.202 Likewise, the Appellate Body in US.-
Shrimp emphatically rejected an argument suggesting that Article
XX might be incompatible with policies relating to the manner of
production of goods produced by another Member (i.e., outside of
one's own borders or overseas). More specifically, the Appellate
Body stated:
It is not necessary to assume that requiring from exporting
countries compliance with, or adoption of, certain policies . . .
prescribed by the importing country, renders a measure a priori
incapable of justification under Article XX. Such an
interpretation renders most, if not all, of the specific exceptions
of Article XX inutile, a result abhorrent to the principles of
interpretation we are bound to apply.203
In practical terms, a WTO panel could rely on the ILO and
other relevant agencies (such as the U.N. Human Rights Council,
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the ICESCR
Committee, and/or the ICCPR Committee) to assist in fact finding;
for instance, these organizations could relate observations of
practices relating to the production processes for a specific product
in a specific country. The information thus garnered could assist
in establishing whether there is a legitimate and serious labor
rights issue with regards to the exported product.2 04
A potential hurdle to success under Article XX is the fact that
panels and the Appellate Body have interpreted the "necessity"
requirement to imply a strict justification of the measures
undertaken as the least trade-restrictive measure available to
achieve the goal. In other words, a measure would not be
"necessary" if a least trade-restrictive alternative was reasonably
available which would achieve the objective in question. The
Appellate Body in Korea-Beef clarified the necessity test by
introducing a "weighing and balancing" of three factors:
(1) [T]he contribution made by the compliance measure to the
202 See id.
203 US.-Shrimp, supra note 14, 121 (emphasis added).
204 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 175.
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enforcement of the law or regulation at issue; (2) the importance
of the common interests or values protected by that law or
regulation; and (3) the accompanying impact of the law or
regulation on imports or exports.205
These factors state that a measure that is necessary can fall
between "indispensible" and "making a contribution to," and such
a measure can also emphasize the significance of the "relative
importance" of the non-trade policy objective in assessing where a
measure falls within the "continuum."20 6 In terms of measures
taken in furtherance of CLS, Marceau states that the test "would
call for the weighing and balancing of whether the specific
measure protects fundamental values and public morals, whether it
contributes to the respect of the policy goal and the importance of
the trade impact."2 07
Given these clarifications, the question in relation to CLS and
the necessity test then becomes whether less trade-restrictive
alternatives to sanctions are reasonably available. While several
alternatives can be posed, including ILO action, diplomatic
protests, boycotts, social labeling, and the like, such alternatives
are unlikely to be reasonably available. Simply stated, the
alternatives lack real credibility and it is highly doubtful that any
will influence the laws and practice of the exporting Member.20 8
The most credible alternative-that the importing Member
205 See Appellate Body Report, Korea-Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh,
Chilled and Frozen Beef T 161-64, WT/DSl61/AB/R, WT/DS169/AB/R (Dec. 11,
2000) (adopted Jan. 10, 2001) [hereinafter Korea-Bee/].
206 See id 161-164. For relevant commentary, see Chris Downes, Must the Losers
ofFree Trade Go Hungry? Reconciling WTO Obligations and the Right to Food, 47 VA.
J. INT'L L. 619, 653 (2007). For GATT-era decisions on necessity, see Panel Report,
Thailand - Restrictions on the Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, DS 10/R-
37S/200 (Oct. 5, 1990). The Appellate Body in Brazil-Tyres further added that, in order
for the measure to "contribute to" the objective, there must be "a genuine relationship of
ends and means between the objective pursued and the measure at issue."; Panel Report,
United States - Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, 5.26, L/6439-36S/345 (Jan. 16,
1989); Brazil-Tyres, supra note 143, 1210.
207 See Trade and Labor, supra note 133, at 551.
208 See, e.g., WITTE, supra note 12, at 52-76 (reviewing the literature on the benefits
and limits of codes of conduct). But see Carlos Manuel Vdsquez, Trade Sanctions and
Human Rights-Past, Present, and Future, 6 J. INT'L EcoN. L. 797, 819-20 (2003)
(arguing there are always other ways to advance human rights goals, and thus trade
sanctions will never be "necessary").
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should utilize the ILO instead of taking trade action-could be
overcome by simply waiting to initiate a WTO dispute until action
that has been taken under the ILO (such as representations and
negotiations) has proven unsuccessful. The history of the
exporting party's relationship with the ILO could also be used to
establish whether there is a record of non-compliance or non-
cooperation towards resolving compliance issues to establish
whether alternatives to trade restrictions are appropriate.2 09
Further, the DSB could also take into account that state obligation
under the ILO Declaration entails a progressive realization of the
full content of fundamental labor rights, which may involve
technical assistance and advisory services.210 Thus, evidence that
the violating state was genuinely co-operating with the ILO, given
the resources and its economic development, would act as a
substantial bar to finding that the measure was "necessary" to
protect public morals.
While the above analysis supports the conclusion that the CLS
could fall within the scope of the "public morals" exception of
Article XX of the GATT, we do not suggest that the
Panel/Appellate Body must conclude that every trade measure
adopted is to restrict the import and sale of products manufactured
in a manner which violates a core labor standard. In addition to
fitting within and meeting the substantive requirements of Article
XX, the chapeau (or introductory clause) of Article XX contains
two additional disciplines to prevent measures that are either
arbitrarily or unjustifiably applied or are a disguised protectionism
from becoming justifiable exceptions under Article XX. 211
The chapeau could be used to effectively filter out "disguised
protectionism" and "unjustifiable discrimination." It mandates
that the application of any measures to be justified under any
paragraph of Article XX must not constitute "a means of arbitrary
or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same
conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international
209 See Howse & Regan, supra note 121, at 168. Indeed, Myanmar's unwillingness
to engage with the ILO and implement its recommendations was a large part of the
justification used by the United States for its sanctions against Myanmar. See also
HOWSE & TREBILCOCK, supra note 91, at 568.
210 See de Wet, supra note 66, at 452-54.
211 See Panel Report, United States - Imports of Certain Automotive Spring
Assemblies, 107-08, L/5333-30S/107 (June 11, 1982).
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trade."2 12 The Appellate Body has interpreted this condition as
requiring that a trade-restrictive measure be reasonably necessary
to achieve the state's valid non-commercial purpose, in what could
be described as imposing a proportionality requirement on Article
XX.213 In practice, this would mean that trade restrictive measures
will be "unjustified discrimination" if the Member imposing the
measure fails to exclude all goods made in violation of CLS from
any country. Further, trade restrictions imposing specific
requirements on exporting Members to preserve CLS on the labor
policies would not be permissible, as WTO jurisprudence makes
clear that the Member evoking the restriction must allow states to
adopt other comparably effective policies.2 14
The preceding analysis demonstrates that use of the "public
morals" exception contained in Article XX as a means to
incorporating labor rights into the WTO is feasible, and that it also
would not require an overhaul to the WTO's current interpretive
methodology. The Appellate Body has repeatedly struck the
appropriate balance between discrimination and general
exceptions for legitimate social values, and has proven to be
especially adept at detecting "protectionist" measures.2 15 There is
no reason to assume that the jurisprudence regarding the
incorporation of CLS would evolve any differently. Measures
would be evaluated on a case-by-case basis and appropriate
benchmarks to establish noncompliance with CLS would be
developed, likely drawing from the expertise of the ILO, relevant
international law, and the likely consequences of the measure, to
ensure that it could adequately detect when sanctions were being
used by Members for protectionism.
212 See GATT, supra note 13, art. XX.
213 See US.-Shrimp, supra note 14, 161-84; see also Appellate Body Report,
Article 21.5 Compliance, US.-Shrimp, 1 5.43-5.144; E.C-Asbestos, supra note 141,
8.224-8.240; US.-Gasoline, supra note 147, at 22-30; Arwel Davies, Interpreting the
Chapeau of GATT Article XY in Light of the 'New' Approach in Brazil-Tyres, 43 J.
WORLD TRADE L. 507 (2009) (arguing that the Appellate Body's interpretation considers
the chapeau's purpose to be to catch "unjustifiable" discrimination, which includes any
country-based discrimination).
214 See US.-Shrimp, supra note 14, T 161-84.
215 But see DAVID KINLEY, CIVILISING GLOBALISATION 71 (Cambridge University
Press ed., 2009) (calling the WTO jurisprudence on human rights and Article XX
"tangential, eclectic and inconsistent").
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B. Incorporating CLS by "Legislative" Means
The third possible way to incorporate CLS into the WTO
framework is the more radical approach-the creation of an
"Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of International Labor
Standards" ("TRILS Agreement"). 2 16 Reflecting the CLS
contained in the ILO Declaration and imposing a positive
obligation on all Members, a TRILS Agreement would ensure the
introduction of minimum labor standards in a manner which does
not constitute or have capacity to constitute barriers to trade while
also avoiding many of the negative implications and potential
legitimacy issues resulting from "judicial" incorporation of
CLS. 217
While it is beyond the scope of this article to even attempt to
design such an agreement, the precise scope and nuances of which
would be determined through complex negotiations between
Members, it is worth mentioning several worthy features which
could be present in an agreement. First, the TRILS Agreement
could begin by recognizing the link between trade and human
rights before acknowledging and affirming existing legal
obligations under human rights law.2 18 Next, the TRILS
Agreement could then reiterate the commitment of Members to
paragraph 4 of the Singapore Ministerial Declaration to "renew
our commitment to the observation of internationally recognized
core labor standards" and to "reject the use of labor standards for
protectionist purposes, and agree that the comparative advantage
of countries, particularly low-wage developing countries, must in
no way be put into question." 2 19  The TRILS Agreement could
216 As an alternative, members could opt for a "decision" on trade and human rights,
or even simply amend Article XX to specifically allow measures necessary to enforce
labor standards. See Choudhury et al., supra note 22; see also Debra P Steger,
Afterword: The "Trade and...." Conundrum-A Commentary, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 135
(2002).
217 See, e.g., Andrew T. Guzman, Trade, Labor, Legitimacy, 91 CALIF. L. REV, 885,
887-88 (2003) (arguing that the Appellate Body is "ill-suited" to decide policy issues and
pointing out that in such instances the Appellate Body will be criticized regardless of
what actions it takes).
218 Such legal obligations include not only the ILO Declaration but also obligations
stemming from core international human rights treaties and even the U.N. Charter. U.N.
Charter art. 55-56.
219 World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 13 December 1996,
WT/MIN(96)/DEC, (1996).
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then affirm paragraph I.A(iv) of ILO's 2008 Declaration on Social
Justice for Fair Globalization, which states "that the violation of
fundamental principles and rights at work cannot be invoked or
otherwise used as a legitimate comparative advantage."220 The
TRILS Agreement could then follow the U.N. High Commissioner
on Human Rights' recommended "human rights approach to
trade":
(a) Sets the promotion and protection of human rights among the
objectives of trade liberalization;
(b) Examines the effects of trade liberalization on individuals
and seeks trade law and policy that take into account the rights
of all individuals, in particular vulnerable individuals and
groups;
(c) Emphasizes the role of the State in the process of
liberalization-not only as negotiators of trade law and setters of
trade policy, but also as the primary duty bearer of human rights;
(d) Seeks consistency between the progressive liberalization of
trade and the progressive realization of human rights;
(e) Requires a constant examination of the impact of trade
liberalization on the enjoyment of human rights;
(f) Promotes international cooperation for the realization of
human rights and freedoms in the context of trade
liberalization.221
Finally, and similar to Article 17, footnote 1 of the U.S.-Peru
FTA, the TRILS Agreement could require a complaining party to
demonstrate that the failure to adopt or maintain a CLS has been
"in a manner affecting either trade or investment." 22 The addition
of such a safeguard could help ensure the Agreement is not used in
a protectionist or unjustified manner.
The TRILS Agreement could be operationalized through a
two-stage process: First, through moral suasion in accordance with
ILO procedures; and second, through economic pressure applied
220 Int'l Labor Org., ILO Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization,
I.A.(iv), Provisional Record 13 A/B (June 10, 2008).
221 Comm'n on Human Rights, Liberalization of Trade in Services and Human
Rights: Report of the High Commissioner, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/9 (June 25, 2002).
222 United States-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement, art. 17, n. 1, Apr. 12, 2006.
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by WTO Members using a provision similar to Article XXIII of
the GATT 223 following proper investigation and consultation with
the ILO regarding the target Member's compliance with the norms
contained in the ILO Declaration.2 24 Unlike incorporation through
the dispute settlement mechanism, a TRILS Agreement envisages
multilateral negotiations and consultations with an
intergovernmental organization before trade restrictions can be
implemented. In this regard, a Committee on Trade and Labor
Standards ("CTLS") could be formed with the mandate to
establish policies and review Members' laws and behavior.22 5
When a Member is accused of violating CLS, and thus the TRILS
Agreement, the CTLS would allow the Member concerned to
respond and provide a buffer time period for the accused Member
to rectify the violations, as per ILO agreements. If the Member
challenges the accusation or otherwise refuses to amend its
policies or practices, WTO Members would be allowed to file a
complaint with the DSB. If consultations do not resolve the
dispute, a panel would be formed and the ILO would be called to
evaluate and comment on whether the Member is fulfilling its
obligations. 2 6  As with violations of other covered agreements, a
223 On Article XXIII of the GATT, see E.C.-Asbestos, supra note 141, 185:
Article XXIII. 1(a) sets forth a cause of action for a claim that a Member has
failed to carry out one or more of its obligations under the GATT 1994. A
claim under Article XXIII.1(a), therefore, lies when a Member is alleged to
have acted inconsistently with a provision of the GATT 1994. Article
XXIII.1(b) sets forth a separate cause of action for a claim that, through the
application of a measure, a Member has 'nullified or impaired' 'benefits'
accruing to another Member, 'whether or not that measure conflicts with the
provisions' of the GATT 1994. Thus, it is not necessary, under Article
XXIII. 1(b), to establish that the measure involved is inconsistent with, or
violates, a provision of the GATT 1994. Cases under Article XXIII. 1(b) are, for
this reason, sometimes described as 'non-violation' cases; we note, though, that
the word 'non-violation' does not appear in this provision.
224 See de Wet, supra note 66, at 456-58.
225 Alternatively, this task could be included in the mandate of the Trade Policy
Review Mechanism. See Guzman, supra note 217 (arguing for incorporation of CLS
through the formation of a labor department in the WTO in the hopes of bringing about
slow, incremental change, but declining to support corresponding dispute settlement).
For criticism of such an approach, see Kolben, supra note 196, at 484-85 (arguing
against WTO incorporation of labor issues in favor of an "integrative linkage" approach
focusing on bilateral and regional developmentally-based systems).
226 This would be modeled on Article 7(3) of the Havana Charter, which stated: "In
all matters relating to labor standards that may be referred to the Organization in
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violation of the TRILS Agreement would be subject to retaliatory
measures. 2 2 7
Despite its attractiveness, the feasibility of a TRILS
Agreement is questionable given widespread developing country
opposition to the trade-labor linkage and consensus decision-
making in the WTO (meaning all Members would even have to
agree to the negotiation of the agreement). That being said, the
very existence of the TRIPS Agreement demonstrates the
possibility of countering extreme opposition to the imposition of
positive trade-related obligations. In the present situation,
developed country Members would without a doubt have to offer
significant trade concessions (i.e., increased market access in
agricultural products) and assistance (both technical and
financial) 228 in exchange for the negotiation of a new agreement. 2 29
While this arrangement may prove difficult, at the very least,
accordance with the provisions of Articles 94 or 95, it shall consult and co-operate with
the International Labor Organisation." United Nations Conference on Trade and
Employment, Havana, Cuba, Nov. 21, 1947-Mar. 24, 1948, Final Act and Related
Documents, art. 7(3), E/Conf. 2/78.
227 It must be noted that evidence on whether sanctions actually initiate change in
trade policy is equivocal. See GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER ET AL., ECONOMIC SANCTIONS
RECONSIDERED: HISTORY AND CURRENT POLICY (Inst. for Int'l Econ., 2d ed. 1990); see
also Farkhanda Mansoor, Laughter and Tears of Developing Countries: The WTO and
the Protection of International Labor Standards, 14 CURRENTS: INT'L TRADE L.J. 60, 63-
64 (2005) (arguing that "[u]nilateral sanctions are unlikely to be effective because they
simply cause a state in question to seek alternate markets or sources of supply"). Jagdish
Bhagwati has similarly stated that "trade sanctions, or their threat, have been not just
unproductive, but also counterproductive" and noted that "the Harkin Bill on banning
products using child labor that was being considered in the U.S. Congress led to the
discharge of female children in textiles [in Bangladesh], who were often forced instead
into prostitution by destitute parents." See Bhagwati, supra note 21, at 132; see also
Kolben, supra note 196, at 482-84 (noting the limitation of trade sanctions); Maskus,
Should Core Labor Standards be Imposed, supra note 73, at 26. Clyde Summers
disputes this view, pointing to empirical evidence demonstrating that the Rugmark
program has reduced child labor in the Indian carpet industry and directly resulted in
more children in school, and there have been similar results in Pakistan for children
phased out from manufacturing footballs. Summers, supra note 6, at 78.
228 Such clauses have been effectively negotiated in environmental agreements, with
many including provisions for technology transfer and funding mechanisms to aid
developing countries in compliance efforts. See Thomas, supra note 80, at 403.
229 Id. at 401-03 (noting that "developing countries' interests ... run counter to IP
protection as well as to labor and environment concerns." Thus, at the Uruguay Round
negotiations, TRIPS was only successfully established via a quid pro quo approach, with
textile and agriculture subsidy reductions exchanged.).
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developed country Members should see the benefit in offering
such incentives, while developing country Members that comply
with CLS should realize that it is in their economic interest to
promote the adoption of a TRILS Agreement.
C. Model Evaluation and Recommendations
From a purely practical point of view, the above two models
incorporating CLS through an evolving understanding of the
GATT Agreement is the easiest way to protect CLS because the
standards would simply be incorporated by jurisprudential fiat
without the need for inter-governmental negotiations and action.
This approach would also permit a panel or the Appellate Body to
take account of the measures taken by an exporting Member in
furtherance of the protection of CLS by allowing the ILO to
identify whether the party is satisfactorily cooperating in order to
find an adequate solution to the recurring violations. This has the
advantage of offering countries a powerful incentive to cooperate
with the ILO, as the failure to cooperate with the ILO could
potentially harm their interests in any potential WTO dispute.
The incorporation of CLS into the WTO through dynamic
interpretation of the GATT suffers from at least three key defects.
First, incorporation of labor standards via panel or Appellate Body
interpretation would be a controversial departure from existing
WTO jurisprudence and require a great deal of "judicial
activism."230 This is problematic for a number of reasons.
Foremost, Article 3.2 of the DSU limits the mandate of the DSB-
and with it, any notion of "judicial activism"-by setting out its
role to "preserve the rights and obligations of Members under the
covered agreements, and to clarify the existing provisions of those
agreements in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of
public international law."23 1  It further states that
"[r]ecommendations and rulings of the DSB cannot add to or
diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered
agreements."2 32 Just as importantly, the legitimacy of the dispute
230 For similar arguments against "judicial" incorporation, see Guzman, supra note
217, at 896-98.
231 Understanding Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, art.
3.2, Apr. 15, 1994., Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401.
232 Id.
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settlement mechanism depends upon Members' continued respect
for and confidence in the system, and the seriousness with which
Members take the "member-driven" nature of the organization
should not be underplayed.233 Judicial activism has for the most
part been avoided in the WTO, and it is clear that Members do not
welcome such activism.
Second, incorporation of CLS via the dispute settlement
system is somewhat disappointing as it prima facie depends upon
unilateral action to restrict trade prior to adjudication by the WTO.
This, in the words of John H. Jackson, would "open a Pandora's
box of problems that could open large loopholes in the GATT."2 34
Thus, even though both judicial models presented in Part 1II. A. of
this article contain sufficient safeguards against abuse, the risk
remains that an innocent Member could have suffered substantial
and significant losses as a result of unwarranted usage of trade
restrictive measures. Moreover, the affected industry would have
to convince its government to initiate and litigate a dispute in the
WTO in order to have the unwarranted trade restrictions lifted.235
Such risks are compounded by the fact that the DSU does not
allow for retrospective trade retaliation, any form of financial
compensation, or any direct assistance to the affected industry.236
For these reasons, allowing states to unilaterally exclude goods
produced in violation of CLS has the potential to unravel the
certainty and predictability of the international trading system
before the matter arrives at the WTO by "institutionalizing
233 See Understanding the WTO: The Organization, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatis-e/tif e/orgl_e.htm (last visited Nov. 13,
2011). For a brief contextual critique, see Bryan Mercurio, Reflections on the World
Trade Organization and the Prospects for Its Future, 10 MELB. J. INT'L L. 49 (2009).
234 See John H. Jackson, World Trade Rules and Environmental Policies:
Congruence or Conflict, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1227, 1243 (1992).
235 On the timeliness, expense, and general nature of WTO dispute settlement
procedures, see Bryan Mercurio, Improving Dispute Settlement in the World Trade
Organization: The Dispute Settlement Understanding Review-Making It Work?, 38 J.
WORLD TRADE 795 (2004); CHAD P. BowN, Self-Enforcing Trade ch. 3 (Brookings
Institution Press ed., 2009).
236 For an analysis of trade retaliation and possible alternatives, see Bryan Mercurio,
Retaliatory Trade Measures in the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding: Are There
Really Alternatives?, in TRADE DISPUTES AND THE DIsPuTE SETTLEMENT
UNDERSTANDING OF THE WTO: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY ASSESSMENT (James Hartigan ed.,
2009).
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unilateralism in a multilateral context." 23 7
Third, by failing to impose any affirmative obligation on
governments to adopt labor protection, "judicial" incorporation
may be inherently limited in its capacity to induce other non-
exporting states to alter their labor practices. The argument
presented throughout this article is that Members are already
obliged under international law to comply with CLS.
By contrast, incorporation of CLS through a TRILS
Agreement provides substantial evidence that the WTO will not
allow its Members to benefit by violating certain recognized
human rights obligations. Furthermore, such an approach
maintains the "member-driven" nature to the organization and
does not rely on creative jurisprudence to create, structure, and
develop the contours of the relationship between CLS and the
covered agreements. Unlike the judicial approach, a TRILS
Agreement would provide absolute procedural and substantive
standards and obligations on which Members could base their
behavior while also shifting the burden of proof from the Member
taking trade measures in furtherance of CLS to the Member
exporting goods in contravention of the CLS. Thus, while we
acknowledge the political difficulties in negotiating a TRILS
Agreement and agree with Robert Howse that "[t]he most
promising short- and medium-term possibility [of incorporating
labor standards] is that WTO jurisprudence might evolve to allow
a coherent approach,"23 8 we are of the belief that the negotiation of
a TRILS Agreement is ultimately in the interests of all interested
parties and stakeholders.
IV. Conclusion
This article attempts to prove not only that international trade
and labor are inextricably linked, but more importantly that the
WTO must take action to ensure that legitimate measures taken in
furtherance of ILO conventions and treaties do not conflict with
WTO rules and obligations. The analysis in this article
237 See Salazar-Xirinachs, supra note 64, at 382; see also Maskus, Should Core
Labor Standards be Imposed, supra note 73, at 60 (noting that the use of Article XX to
enforce labor standards "would invite unilateral action against labor standards on a
heretofore-unseen scale," endangering the very existence of a liberal trading order).
238 See Howse & Regan, supra note 121, at 168.
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demonstrates why CLS should be incorporated into the WTO from
a moral perspective, as well as from a textual analysis of the
GATT. Moreover, the article countered many of the arguments
against the linkage of trade and labor and revealed them as being
misconceived, exaggerated, and based on the ethically and
economically questionable premise that non-compliance with core
labor standards risks undermining a country's comparative
advantage.
Crucially, this article showed how the WTO already has
certain tools at its disposal to find a suitable balance to oversee
unilateral sanctions, namely through a DSB determination, either
that products manufactured in compliance with CLS are not "like"
products manufactured in violation of CLS, or through the Article
XX(a) exception for public morals. That being the case, important
legitimacy implications resulting from judicial incorporation of
labor standards provide strong incentives for Members to muster
the necessary political will to institute a social clause into the
WTO dealing with core labor rights. Thus, this article calls for
WTO Members to draft a TRILS Agreement that respects both
Member rights to legitimate trade advantages as well as the CLS
recognized in other international agreements.
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